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I. INTRODUCTION
The genetic engineering of plants began in the 1970s, and the U.S.
regulatory and legal systems are still adapting to this new technology.1 The
U.S. agriculture, food, and commodity crop trade industries are not waiting
for regulations and laws to catch up; genetically engineered crops are already
grown, consumed, and traded throughout the national and international
markets in large quantities.2 In 2014, 96% of cotton, 94% of soy, and 93% of
U.S. grown corn was genetically engineered.3 The sheer prevalence, novelty,
and uniqueness of this technology, has created a number of problems. The
agricultural, food, and commodity crop trade industries face confusing,
disjointed, and contradicting regulations and restrictions on genetic
engineering from both the United States and foreign countries.4
The current state of affairs, given the combination of a mammoth
amount of genetically engineered crops, muddled regulations, and the
intricacies of global agricultural commodity trade markets, is a prime set-up
for the improper use of genetically engineered crops.5 It is of utmost
importance that a farmer’s genetically engineered seeds are approved for
their intended use.6 Exporters of genetically engineered crops must navigate
around the approximately sixty countries worldwide that have various bans,

1

See Matthew Rich, The Debate Over Genetically Modified Crops in the United
States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
889, 890 (2004) (“[G]enetic modification, or genetic engineering, is generally defined as a
recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, whereby a segment of DNA from one organism is
extracted and spliced into a recipient organism’s preexisting DNA.”); see also Diamon v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310, 318 (1980) (holding that genetically engineered bacteria
could be patented); John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, And the
Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 809 (2001) (“[M]odern
genetic engineering, i.e., the actual in vitro modification of DNA at the molecular level, was
first reported in the scientific literature in 1973.”).
2
This article uses the term “genetically engineered.” Genetically engineered
crops are also frequently referred to as “bioengineered,” “genetically modified,” “GM,” “GE,”
“genetically modified organisms,” “GMO,” and “biotech crops.” Quotations from sources
using monikers other than “genetically engineered” will be left as is.
3
USDA Economic Research Service, Recent Trends in GE Adoption,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-theus/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx (last updated July 14, 2014).
4
See generally Sabrina Wilson, Induced Nuisance: Holding Patent Owners
Liable for GMO Cross-Contamination, 64 EMORY L.J. 169, 172 (2014) (“[A]lthough scholars
have suggested that new legislation should be drafted to specifically address the introduction
of genetically engineered crops, the federal government has relied on the preexisting
framework to regulate new genetic engineering technology. There is no legal framework that
directly addresses cross-contamination by GMOS, and the current regulatory framework is not
able to prevent GMO cross-contamination of non-GM crops.”).
5
Id.
6
See infra Part II (narrating the financial and legal consequences to all parties
when a genetically engineered crop is sold for an unapproved use or escapes the control of the
seed company).
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restrictions, or labeling requirements for genetically engineered foods.7
Particularly with commodity crops destined for export, both the farmer and
the exporter may lose enormous amounts of time and money if the
genetically engineered crop they grew or purchased is not approved for its
intended use.8
Unfortunately, when genetically engineered crops are improperly
used, the legal claims that allow farmers and exporters to successfully
recover damages against seed companies are unclear because the case law
addressing this issue is limited.9 Farmers and exporters need to know what
legal remedies exist when, for example, they rely on representations that a
genetically engineered corn variety is approved in all foreign markets, only
to discover, upon rejection after exportation, that the corn is not approved in
Japan.10 Furthermore, farmers and exporters will likely bring claims against
seed companies going forward because both the lax regulations and seed
companies’ recurrent failures to comply with the regulations show that little
incentive exists to exercise caution when selling a newly genetically
engineered crop.11
This article focuses on the legal remedies available to farmers and
exporters injured by seed companies that (1) provide misleading
representations about the proper use of genetically engineered crops or (2)
mishandle genetically engineered crops. This article will use the case law
from the StarLink corn fiasco of 2000 and the LibertyLink rice debacle of
2006 to present the most effective tort remedies available to farmers and
exporters harmed by seed companies.12 After consulting the case law, the
7

E.g., Ctr. for Food Safety, Map: Genetically Engineered Food Labeling Laws
(Mar. 2013) available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/cfs-ge-labeling-map-march2013_38812.pdf; Non GMO Project, GMO Facts, NON GMO PROJECT (last visited Apr. 17,
2015) http://www.nongmoproject.org/learn-more/); Organic Consumers Assoc., Countries &
Regions with GE Food/Crop Bans, Organic Consumers Association (last visited Apr. 17,
2015) https://www.organicconsumers.org/old_articles/gefood/countrieswithbans.php.
8
See infra Part II.A.1.B (explaining how the EPA regulates genetically
engineered crops).
9
See infra Part II.B.,C (discussing the two major cases addressing farmers and
exporters legal claims for the improper use of genetically engineered crops, In re Starlink
Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841–42 (N.D. Ill. 2002) and In re Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811-CDP (E.D. Mo. 2009) (multidistrict litigation)
[hereinafter LibertyLink Rice].
10
See Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 841–42 (identifying four common points
at which an unapproved GE crop could enter the food supply and cause harm: (1) farmers
purchasing and using seed that they do not know has been contaminated with the GE trait, (2)
cross-pollination that contaminated a field with the unapproved GE crop, (3) the unapproved
GE crop is mixed in with other crops after harvest during transportation or storage (e.g. at a
feed mill), and (4) the unapproved GE crop is mixed with an approved crop by a food
manufacturer).
11
See infra Part II.C.1 (narrating the post-contamination approval of LibertyLink
rice by the U.S. government).
12
See infra Part II; Melinda Fulmer, Taco Bell Recalls Shells That Used
Bioengineered
Corn,
L.A.
TIMES
(Sept.
23,
2000),
available
at
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conclusions are extrapolated and applied to the current litigation surrounding
the 2013 Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn disaster, and to future
hypothetical cases.13
This article begins with an explanation of the U.S. governmental
bodies that regulate genetic engineering because these regulations form the
foundation for plaintiffs’ legal claims.14 The discussion of the Starlink Corn
and LibertyLink Rice cases focuses on both the facts of the cases and the
claims brought in the lawsuits.15 After the discussion of past cases, the facts
of Syngenta Corn are presented as a recent situation where the seed company
misrepresented the approval status of Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn to
farmers.16 The analysis begins by comparing the legal claims brought in
Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice with the claims that will likely be
brought in Syngenta Corn.17 In sum, this article concludes that plaintiffs are
likely to succeed in tort claims that do not require findings of intentional
conduct by the defendants because showing that seed companies intended to
cause harm to the plaintiffs is more difficult than showing that the seed
companies’ actions resulted in harm to plaintiffs.18
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Patchwork System Regulating Genetically Engineered Crops
The regulation of crops in the United States depends on how the crop
is categorized. Agricultural crops in the United States can be categorized into
three main types: (1) conventional but not genetically engineered; (2)
conventional and genetically engineered; and (3) organic.19 Of those
genetically engineered crops, there are even more sub-categories: (a)
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/23/news/mn-25314 (reporting the 2000 food recalls
because of StarLink corn); Tom Parsons, Farmers Face Off with Chemical Maker over Rice,
BOSTON.COM (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/03/28
/farmers_face_off_with_chemical_maker_over_rice/ (reporting the lawsuits filed after the
2006 LibertyLink rice contamination).
13
See infra Part III.A (comparing and contrasting Starlink Corn, LibertyLink
Rice, and Syngenta Corn).
14
See infra Part II.A (outlining the regulatory system that governs genetically
engineered crops).
15
See infra Part II.B, II.C (discussing Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice).
16
See infra Part II.D (discussing Syngenta Corn).
17
See infra Part III (exploring the commonalities between the claims brought in
these suits).
18
See infra Part IV.
19
See Miles McEvoy, Organic 101: Can GMOs Be Used In Organic Products?,
USDA BLOG (May 17, 2013), http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/05/17/organic-101-can-gmos-beused-in-organic-products/ (explaining that genetic engineering cannot be used in organic
production of crops); see also Biotechnology Frequently Asked Questions, (FAQs), USDA
(Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=AGRICULTURE
&contentid=BiotechnologyFAQs.xml (explaining the various uses of genetic engineering in
conventional cropping systems).
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approved for human consumption; (b) not approved for human consumption
but approved for other uses (e.g. animal feed and ethanol); (c) approved for
export to certain countries; (d) not approved for export to certain counties;
(e) approved for experimental use; and (f) not approved for any use at all.20
A genetically engineered crop is often subject to a variety of restrictions and
approvals, which differ amongst the numerous countries of the world.21 For
example, a genetically engineered crop could be approved for all uses in the
United States, but only approved as animal feed in the European Union, and
not approved at all in Japan.22
1. The Regulatory Bodies Governing Genetically Engineered Crops
In the United States, three governmental agencies regulate different
aspects of genetically engineered crops: the Food and Drug Agency (FDA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). 23 The FDA’s priority is the regulation of genetically
engineered foods that may be unsafe for consumer consumption, whereas the
USDA focuses on preventing the proliferation of “plant pests,” and the EPA
only regulates those genetically engineered crops engineered to produce

20

See International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, GM
Approval Database | GMO Database | GM Crop Approvals, ISAAA, http://www.isaaa.org/gm
approvaldatabase/default.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2015) (providing a database of the regulatory
status of any genetically engineered crop in all countries); see infra Part II.A.1 (explaining
how the EPA, USDA, and FDA classify and regulate genetically engineered crops).
21
See International Service, supra note 20 (providing a global database recording
the restrictions and approvals for genetically engineered crops in different countries).
22
Japan is used as an example because it only allows a limited list of genetically
engineered crops to be imported and has a zero-tolerance policy for any unapproved
genetically engineered crops or foods, meaning that no level of the unapproved genetically
engineered material is acceptable. See The Organic and Non-GMO Report, Japan’s
Legislation on Labeling of Genetically Engineered Foods (Feb. 2003), http://www.nongmoreport.com/articles/millenium/japanlegislationlabelinggmfoods.php (describing Japan’s
regulatory and approval system for genetically engineered foods and chronicling how many
crops are approved by Japan).
23
See generally Rebecca Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons
from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 593 (2003)
(detailing the regulatory system for genetically engineered foods); Thomas Redick,
Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies For Improving Global Consumer Confidence, 44
JURIMETRICS J. 5 (2003) (providing more information on the regulation of genetically
engineered crops); USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, Coordinated
Framework (Dec. 16, 2014), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/wps/portal/
aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa_regulations/ct_agency_framework_roles/!ut/p/a0/04_Sj9CPy
kssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOK9_D2MDJ0MjDzd3V2dDDz93HwCzL29jAyMTPULsh0VAU
1Vels!/ (providing a copy of the actual statutory schema for regulating genetically engineered
crops).
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pesticides. 24 Each of these regulatory agencies uses different bodies of law to
pursue their regulatory objectives.25
i. The FDA
Congress granted the FDA the power to regulate food with the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).26 The FDA “has the power
to remove unsafe foods from the marketplace and to hold producers legally
responsible for the safety of the foods they market.”27 The FDA can seize
any genetically engineered food “that causes an allergic reaction or otherwise
threatens human health.”28 Ultimately, the FDA regulates genetically
engineered crops to ensure that they are safe for human consumption, except
for those genetically engineered crops which contain pesticides, which the
FDA delegated to the EPA.29
ii The EPA
To regulate genetically engineered foods containing pesticides, the
EPA created a system that requires a genetically engineered crop to obtain
Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) registration in
order to be approved for sale.30 The EPA also established a system of
exceptions to the FIFRA registration requirement known as tolerances and
exemptions.31 The EPA regulates those FIFRA-registered pesticides and
ensures that any unregistered pesticides are not sold or distributed.32 A
pesticide can only be registered under FIFRA if it does “not cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”33 As noted, supra, if the
pesticide in question is “used in the production of food or food crops,” it is
also regulated under the FFDCA.34 Thus, any owner of a genetically
24

Bratspies, supra note 23, at 600, 605, 612.
See infra Part II A.1.A–C (discussing the USDA, EPA, FDA and the federal
statutes that give them authority).
26
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 605.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 609.
29
Id. at 606–07 (explaining that the regulatory standard for genetically
engineered crops that “involve the addition of genes that code for novel proteins (notably
pesticide proteins like Bt)” is different than that for other genetically engineered crops and
that the EPA regulates genetically engineered crops only if those crops were genetically
engineered “to produce . . . pesticides.”).
30
Id. at 611–14 (detailing the EPA’s system for regulating genetically engineered
crops).
31
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 612–13 (stating that in a situation where a
genetically engineered crop is expected to cause pesticide “residues to remain on or in food,”
the EPA cannot register the crop under FIFRA unless it grants it a tolerance level or an
exception).
32
Id. at 612.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 613.
25
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engineered crop that is in violation of its registration, tolerance level, or
exemption would be subject to an enforcement action by the FDA.35 FIFRA
does not provide a civil cause of action, but the federal statute does not
prevent a state from “creating civil remedies for” violations of FIFRA.36
iii. The USDA
The USDA, on the other hand, has a more narrow focus than the
FDA and the EPA. The USDA has the power to regulate the “interstate
movement of genetically engineered crops under the Federal Plant Protection
Act (“FPPA”)”, which it accomplishes through the Animal Health Plant
Inspection (APHIS) agency.37 The USDA’s regulation of genetically
engineered crops is limited to the narrow question of whether the genetically
engineered crop “will itself pose a conventional plant pest risk when
introduced into the environment and/or interstate commerce.”38 A “plant
pest” is defined as “any living organism that directly or indirectly injures, or
causes disease or damage, to a plant.”39 If the USDA decides that the
genetically engineered crop is not a plant pest, the crop is assigned
“‘nonregulated’ status” by the USDA.40 The first step to obtaining
nonregulated status is for the developer of a genetically engineered crop to
notify the USDA that it intends to conduct a field trial of the crop.41 The
USDA must either approve or disapprove the proposed field trial within ten
to thirty days.42 After the field trial is complete, the developer can petition
the USDA for “nonregulated status and approval for commercial sales.”43
Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the USDA must also
conduct an environmental assessment of the genetically engineered crop
before deciding that it is not a plant pest and granting it nonregulated status.44
35

Id.
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (citing Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d
124 at 128 (4th Cir. 1992) and 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)) (explaining that although only the EPA has
standing to enforce FIFRA, states could create civil remedies for violating FIFRA).
37
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 599 (recounting the Reagan Administration’s
creation of the Coordinated Framework system to regulate genetically engineered foods and
crops); see also Coordinated Framework, supra note 23 (providing an overview of the role of
the regulatory agencies that regulate genetically engineered foods and crops).
38
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 602.
39
Id. at 602 (citing 7 C.F.R § 340.1).
40
Id. at 602, 604–05.
41
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 604.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See generally Environmental Documents, USDA ANIMAL AND PLANT
INSPECTION
SERVICE
(Sept.
2,
2014),
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
wps/portal/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa_landing_page/sa_spotlights/ct_submissions_hom
e/!ut/p/a1/jZDLDoIwEEW_yHRseMgSUKE81A0Ru2mqYmkChdjqwq8X2IvMbibn5mYOoq
hEVPG3FNzITvFm3KnDkmOM1wFgEkW7AMhhn53cNMGA7QG4zACpvSwfRn5suRkA
WBsMZBvEW9fLAYizLA8_xod_WRBAX7mYS4Q7bmpV1I9OlRqzhqu7lIJ1nNRTQfdd6aRojYalTfD9OvaSq0Hj5rVXVuhM
36

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/6

8

Holm: When They Don't Want Your Corn

2015]

WHEN THEY DON'T WANT YOUR CORN

565

B. StarLink Corn: Not Approved for Human Consumption, Yet in the
Food Supply
In spite of the piecemeal structure of the regulations surrounding
genetically engineered crops, the regulations are ultimately clear enough for
seed companies and others familiar with the industry to understand.45
Whether a seed company complies with the regulations is another matter.46
Seed companies that fail to comply with regulations or cause their customers
to violate regulations should expect lawsuits filed against them.
1. The Facts of Starlink Corn: Aventis’ Failure to Inform Farmers of
Restrictions and the Ensuing Damage
Starlink Corn was the first case to address the legal remedies for
farmers who were sold genetically engineered seeds without warning of their
regulatory restrictions.47 In 1998, the biotechnology and seed company
Aventis CropScience received FIFRA registration from the EPA for its new
product, StarLink corn.48 StarLink corn was engineered to produce Cry9C, a
type of Bt toxin that was toxic to insects.49 The EPA restricted StarLink’s
registration to commercial use, barring it from being sold for human
consumption.50 However, Aventis failed to instruct farmers of this restriction
6KzZaOsCZizMQEz7_ZtUZSfLPCI9LVYbgJ/?1dmy&urile=wcm%3apath%3a%2FAPHIS_Content_Library%2FSA_Our_Focus%2
FSA_Biotechnology%2FSA_Environmental_Documents%2F (detailing the Environmental
Assessment/Environmental Impact report process and requirements).
45
See Bratspies, supra note 23, at 620 (offering the example of Aventis agreeing
to comply with regulations).
46
See infra Part II.B.1 (narrating Aventis’ failure to comply with regulations);
Part II.C.1 (narrating Bayer’s failure to keep unapproved rice contained as required by
regulations); see also infra Part II.D.1 (narrating Syngenta’s failure to explain to farmers that
its genetically engineered corn was not accepted in certain markets).
47
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“Aventis did not include the EPAmandated label on some StarLink packages, did not notify, instruct and remind StarLink
farmers of the restrictions on StarLink use, proper segregation methods and buffer zone
requirements, and did not require StarLink farmers to sign the obligatory contracts.”).
48
Id. at 833; see also Syngenta, History Recalled of Disappearing Garst Seed,
AGPROFESSIONAL (May 6, 2013), available at http://www.agprofessional.com/news/Historyrecalled-of-disappearing-Garst-seed-206365601.html (explaining that Aventis CropScience
sold the seed through its licensee, Garst Seed Company); Bayer Buys CropScience, CNN (Oct.
2. 2001, 3:26 PM), available at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2001/10/02/europe/bayer/ (explaining
that Aventis CropScience was acquired by Bayer, Inc. in 2001 and is now known as Bayer
CropScience, Inc.).
49
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 832–38 (noting that Cry9C was similar to
“known human allergens”); see also Bratspies, supra note 23, at 599 (explaining that Cry9C
kills pests by destroying the insect’s stomach cells).
50
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (mentioning that StarLink’s registration
limited it to “animal feed, ethanol production and seed increase.”); see also Starlink Corn
Regulatory Information, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last updated Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/starlink_corn.htm (specifying that “in 1998,
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because Aventis thought it would get EPA approval for the use of StarLink
for human consumption later.51 Aventis repeatedly tried to obtain registration
for StarLink; it even tried to obtain retroactive approval after the corn was
found in human food.52 The EPA never gave the expected approval,
eliminating Aventis’ last excuse for noncompliance.53 StarLink was sold in
the United States between May 1998 and October 2000, by the end of which
StarLink was being grown on approximately 350,000 acres.54
The EPA imposed detailed special regulations and requirements on
the cultivation of StarLink.55 These restrictions included “mandatory
segregation methods” such as a 660-foot “buffer zone” between any StarLink
corn and other corn growing in the fields.56 The EPA also explicitly made
Aventis responsible for these restrictions, obligating it to:
(a) inform farmers of the EPA’s requirements for the
planting, cultivation and use of StarLink; (b) instruct farmers
growing StarLink how to store and dispose of the StarLink
seeds, seed bags, and plant detritus; and (c) ensure that all
farmers purchasing StarLink seeds signed a contract binding
them to these terms before permitting them to grow StarLink
corn.57
Aventis’ duty to explain to farmers that StarLink could only be used
for animal feed and industrial non-food purposes existed at the time of
delivery of the seed, prior to planting, prior to harvest, and after harvest.58
Aventis’ failure to inform farmers of the stringent restrictions on
StarLink directly resulted in the contamination of the human food supply.59
EPA registered StarLink™ for commercial use, provided that all grain derived from
StarLink™ corn was directed to domestic animal feed or to industrial uses (e.g., biofuels).”).
51
See Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“Prior to the 2000 growing season
Aventis allegedly instructed its seed representatives that it was unnecessary for them to advise
StarLink farmers to segregate their StarLink crop or create buffer zones because Aventis
believe the EPA would amend the registration to permit StarLink use for human
consumption.”).
52
Bratspies, supra note 23, at 625–26 (“Aventis sought to deal with the problem
of StarLink contamination of the human food supply by requesting that EPA grant CRY9C a
limited retroactive tolerance.”).
53
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp 2d at 835 (noting that in July 2001 the EPA
reaffirmed its position that StarLink had allergenic qualities and the FDA declared it to be an
adulterant under 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq.).
54
Id. at 835.
55
Id. at 834–35 (including requiring Aventis to have growers sign “Grower
Agreements” that would give further details on the proper management of StarLink grown,
telling growers where to sell their corn so that it would be directed toward appropriate uses
and not towards the food supply, and requiring labels on the bags in which the corn was sold).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 835 (noting EPA regulations requiring Aventis to conduct a follow-up
survey with growers after harvest).
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The EPA had required Aventis to inform growers of the strict restrictions on
StarLink corn, but farmers insisted they did not receive notice.60 Other
farmers said they were informed by Aventis after they had planted the corn
but were told not to worry because Aventis expected to receive EPA
approval soon.61 There was also evidence that at least some of the bags
containing StarLink corn seed had no labels that informed farmers of the
restrictions.62
The first discovery of StarLink corn in human food was in
September of 2000, when Friends of the Earth, a consumer group, found
traces of it in taco shells sold under the Taco Bell name.63 More detections of
the presence of StarLink in human food quickly followed this initial
discovery.64 Aventis failed to inform farmers that the corn could not be sold
for human consumption and to ensure that it was not sold for human
consumption.65
The news that StarLink corn, unapproved for human consumption,
was spread throughout the U.S. corn supply sent shock waves into the corn
markets.66 Not only did Japan and Europe have a strict policy against
importing the corn, but the EPA’s concerns about StarLink causing allergic
reactions in humans sparked fears in consumers.67 Fearful of StarLink
59

Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
Barnaby J. Feder, Farmers Cite Scarce Data in Corn Mixing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/17/business/farmers-cite-scarce-data-in-cornmixing.html (reporting the accounts of farmers who say that they were either not informed
that the corn was unfit for human consumption, or were informed that it was unfit for human
consumption, but that the EPA was going to change the restrictions).
61
Id. at 2 (“[Farmers] said that while they were told last spring that the corn had
not been approved by federal regulators for human consumption, they were also told that they
need not worry because approval was expected shortly.”).
62
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (“Aventis did not include the EPAmandated label on some StarLink packages. . .”), see also Genetically Engineered Food Alert,
StarLink’s Impacts on the Farm Economy, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY,
http://www.iatp.org/files/StarLinks_Impacts_on_the_Farm_Economy.htm#_ftn1 (last visited
Feb. 21, 2015) (reporting in Footnote 1 that the IATP obtained a StarLink bag); Gabriella
Flora, Aventis: Global Compact Violator, CORPWATCH (June 14, 2001),
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=621 (reporting in Footnote 13 that author Gabriella
Flora obtained a StarLink bag).
63
Marcella S. Kreiter, StarLink Corn Scandal Continues to Spread, UNITED
PRESS INT’L
(Oct.
25,
2000,
12:48
PM),
https://www.organicconsumers.
org/old_articles/ge/thirdtaco.php.
64
Id. (reporting that Aventis was unable to account for about 9 million bushels of
StarLink in October of 2000).
65
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (“Aventis did not include the EPAmandated label on some StarLink packages.”).
66
Id. at 835 (detailing the repercussions from food manufacturers and foreign
countries after StarLink was found in the human food supply).
67
See generally Michael Hansen, Comments on the Assessment of Scientific
Information Concerning StarLink Corn (Cry9C Bt Corn Plant-Pesticide)EPA Docket Number
OPP-00688, CONSUMERSUNION (Nov. 28, 2000), available at http://consumersunion.
org/news/comments-concerning-starlink-corn/ (detailing the Consumers Union’s concerns
about the Cry9C toxin in a letter to the EPA and asking the EPA to not remove the restrictions
60
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contamination, U.S. food producers began sourcing foreign corn for their
products in place of domestic corn.68 Foreign importers, including South
Korea and Japan, stopped importing or reduced their imports of U.S. corn.69
Those businesses involved in buying and selling corn, particularly to foreign
markets, were faced with the immense and expensive task of testing their
corn for StarLink contamination.70
Unsurprisingly, Aventis was inundated with lawsuits.71 A class
action of farmers was consolidated in the Eastern Division of the Northern
District Court of Illinois as In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liability Litigation v.
Aventis Crop Science and was decided on July 11, 2002.72 Aventis appealed
the trial court’s decision in favor of the plaintiffs and ultimately the suit
settled out of court for $110 million in February 2013.73
2. The Legal Claims in Starlink Corn
Although the Starlink Corn case settled out of court, the July 11,
2002 district court opinion on Aventis’ motion to dismiss in Starlink Corn is
still valuable for its discussion of the claims put forth in the court’s ruling on
the motion to dismiss.74 Aventis moved to dismiss the class action lawsuit,
arguing that FIFRA preempted all of the plaintiffs’ state law claims, that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, and that the economic loss doctrine
barred any recovery for damages.75 The court held that the plaintiffs’ claims
were not preempted by FIFRA, and while the economic loss doctrine was
applicable, it did not bar recovery.76 The plaintiffs were left with five strong
on the registration of StarLink corn); see also Andrew Pollack, Altered Corn Surfaced Earlier,
TIMES
(Sept.
4,
2001),
available
at
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/business/04STAR.html (reporting the public’s concerns
about allergenic effects of StarLink).
68
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
69
Id. at 835 (“South Korea, Japan and other foreign countries have terminated or
substantially limited imports of U.S. corn.”).
70
Id. (“Grain elevators and transport providers are now mandating expensive
testing on all corn shipments.”).
71
See Associated Press, Taco Bell Sues Over Starlink Corn Fiasco, ORGANIC
CONSUMERS ASSOC. (Sept. 19, 2001), available at https://www.organicconsumers
.org/old_articles/gefood/tacobellsues092501.php (noting filing of class action suit by 4,600
Taco Bell restaurants and franchises); Neil E. Harl et al, The StarLink Situation, IOWA STATE
EXTENSION (Nov. 18, 2003) at 25, available at http://www.extension.iastate.e
du/nr/rdonlyres/2306d560-122d-4993-8cc7-be9e91ca5009/0/0010star (“On March 7, 2002,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Chicago approved a $9 million
settlement in a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of consumers who said they suffered
allergic reactions from eating food products containing StarLink™ corn.”).
72
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 828.
73
Paul Elias, Biotech Firms Will Pay $110 million to Settle StarLink Corn
Lawsuit,
THE TOPEKA
CAPITAL-JOURNAL
(Feb.
7,
2003),
available
at
http://cjonline.com/stories/020703/usw_biotech.shtml (reporting terms of settlement);
74
See generally Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 828–50.
75
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
76
Id. at 883.
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claims: negligence per se, negligence, private nuisance, public nuisance, and
strict liability.77 The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for conversion and
the North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (NCUTPA) violations, and, so
far as they were based on a theory of a failure to warn, the negligence and
strict liability claims as well.78 The plaintiffs’ claims for negligence per se,
public nuisance, private nuisance, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) as well as negligence and strict liability (under new
theories) survived Aventis’ motion to dismiss.79
i. The Economic Loss Doctrine Limits Tort Claims and Damages
The Starlink Corn plaintiffs showed they had permissible damages
according to the economic loss doctrine, which limits the recoverable
damages in tort claims.80 According to the economic loss doctrine, “when a
defective product causes solely economic loss, the buyer may pursue
damages only through contract law . . . [but] if the defective product causes
personal injury or property damage, the buyer may pursue damages only
through tort law.”81 The farmers in Starlink Corn had permissible tort claims
because they had claims to harm to property and had never purchased
StarLink corn so they did not have contracts with Aventis that forced them to
seek contract remedies.82 The plaintiffs’ claims survived Aventis’ motion to
dismiss because the court deemed the alleged contamination was property
damage, “either by cross-pollination in the fields or by commingling later in
the distribution chain.”83 The court found that the corn, as a defective
77

Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 852.
79
Id. at 843–52 (stating that the negligence and strict liability claim survived
summary judgment under the new articulation—that Aventis had a “duty to ensure that
StarLink did not enter the human food supply, and their failure to do so caused plaintiff’s corn
to be contaminated.”).
80
Id. at 838.
81
Ralph A. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 1121, 1121–22 (2010), available at http://scholarship.law
.marquette.edu/mulr/vol93/iss3/5/.
82
See Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (explaining that the plaintiffs include
only those farmers who did not purposefully grow StarLink). Plaintiffs in other cases may
have to seek contract remedies. However, the contracts (“Grower Agreements”) generally do
not involve bargaining between the parties and therefore, frequently favor the seed companies.
See Neil D. Hamilton, Farmer’s Legal Guide to Production Contracts, UNIVERSITY OF
ARKANSAS (Jan. 1995) at 6, http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads
/assets/articles/hamilton_productioncontracts.pdf (providing a basic overview of grower
agreements in order to educate farmers and stating that “producers can find themselves at a
disadvantage when bargaining with the company that may have developed the genetics and
that controls the end-use market”); generally The Farm Business Development Center,
Grower Agreement, PRAIRIE CROSSING FARM, http://www.prairiecrossingfarms.com
/groweragreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (showing an example of a grower
agreement);.
83
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 842–43.
78
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product, caused harm to the plaintiffs’ property, legitimizing the plaintiffs’
tort claims.84
ii. Negligence Per Se and Avoiding FIFRA Preemption
Plaintiffs’ claims may be preempted by FIFRA when the genetically
engineered crop in question is regulated by the EPA.85 FIFRA does not
provide a private cause of action but it does not prevent states from creating
their own civil liabilities for FIFRA violations.86 FIFRA prevents plaintiffs
from suing to enforce FIFRA because it gives the EPA the power to sue to
enforce FIFRA.87 Hence, in a situation where the defendant has allegedly
violated FIFRA, the plaintiff must plead a claim that is not preempted by
FIFRA.88 The Starlink Corn plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim for Aventis’
failure to comply with the EPA and FIFRA regulations was not preempted
by FIFRA because it may have existed as a private cause of action under
state law.89 However, the court did not actually find that a state civil remedy
existed.90 The court merely found that if a state civil remedy did in fact exist,
the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled Aventis’ violation of EPA and FIFRA
regulations.91 The Starlink Corn plaintiffs were allowed to continue with
their “theory that defendants (1) violated duties imposed by the limited
registration; (2) made representations to StarLink growers that contradicted
the EPA-approved label; and (3) failed to inform parties handling StarLink
corn downstream of the EPA-approved warnings.”92
The plaintiffs artfully framed their claims to avoid FIFRA
preemption.93 For example, the plaintiffs did not claim that Aventis lacked an
effective warning label on the corn because FIFRA regulates these warning
labels.94 If the plaintiffs had argued that Aventis’ label was inadequate, the
84

Id. at 841–843 (“[T]he economic loss [doctrine] . . . does not bar claims for
injuries to other property, or claims alleged in combination with non-economic losses. The
question then becomes defining ‘other property’”).
85
Overview of FIFRA, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lfra.html
(last updated June 27, 2012) (providing a summary of FIFRA and explaining that FIFRA
gives the EPA the authority to regulate pesticides but does not fully preempt state law).
86
Id.
87
WASTE & CHEMICAL ENFORCEMENT DIV., EPA, FIFRA ENFORCEMENT
RESPONSE POLICY 4–5 (2009), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/fifraerp1209.pdf (containing the FIFRA Enforcement Response Policy promulgated by the EPA).
88
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835–837.
89
Id.at 836.
90
Id. at 836 n.3 ( “At this point we [the court] express no opinion as to whether
the ten jurisdictions in question recognize a civil remedy for the FIFRA violations alleged
here.”).
91
Id. at 836–37.
92
Id. at 838.
93
Id. at 835–36 (ruling that FIFRA “prohibits states from imposes any labeling
requirements beyond those imposed by the EPA).
94
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 835–36 (citing 7 U.S.C. 136(v)(b)).
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plaintiffs’ claims would have been preempted under FIFRA.95 However, the
court suggested that plaintiffs could maintain a private cause of action for
false or misleading representations not contained on the label, because
FIFRA exclusively regulates representations contained on the label itself.96
iii. Negligence
The plaintiffs also sought negligence claims against Aventis. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligence as “conduct which falls
below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm.”97 The elements of negligence are duty, breach of
duty, proximate cause, and damages.98 In each individual situation
concerning genetically engineered crops, the court will determine the
defendant’s duty.99
In Starlink Corn, the court concluded the alleged duty was “Aventis
had a duty to ensure that StarLink did not enter the human food supply, and
their failure to do so caused plaintiff’s corn to be contaminated.”100 The court
rejected Aventis’ articulation of the duty alleged as “to preserve the market
price of corn,” and instead “read the complaint to allege direct harm to
plaintiff’s corn”101 This ruling was based only on the pleadings, so the ruling
on the motion to dismiss merely decided that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled
the elements of negligence to allow the claim to proceed.102 If the case had
gone to trial, Aventis’s duty would have been a factual dispute.103
Nevertheless, Starlink Corn’s discussion of the duty a seed company owes
farmers sheds light on the effectiveness of negligence claims in these
scenarios.104

95

Id. at 836.
Id. at 837–38 (adding that a plaintiff could also have a private cause of action if
the alleged defective design of the product itself and not of the warning label).
97
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
98
See Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d. at 843 (“Defendants challenge three
separate elements: duty, proximate cause and damages.”).
99
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965); generally United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947) (providing early example of a court
determining the duty of the defendant).
100
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
96
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iv. Private Nuisance
The plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance also survived Aventis’
motion to dismiss.105 The plaintiffs alleged that Aventis “created a private
nuisance by distributing corn seeds with the Cry9C protein, knowing that
they would cross-pollinate with neighboring corn crops.”106 The court
defined a private nuisance as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest
in the private use and enjoyment of land.”107 The pivotal issue in dispute was
whether Aventis could be liable for nuisance for seeds it had sold and no
longer controlled.108 The court found that Aventis could be liable under a
“substantial participation” theory, because “one can be liable for nuisance . .
. when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on.”109 The court
found that Aventis could be liable under a substantial participation theory
because Aventis had “an affirmative duty to enforce StarLink farmers’
compliance with the Grower Agreements.”110 This duty, the court held,
“arguably gave Aventis some measure of control over StarLink’s use, as well
as a means to abate any nuisance caused by its misuse.”111 Additionally, the
court found Aventis’ failure to provide warnings and its incorrect
representations were “arguably the type of culpable conduct” relied upon in
another case imposing liability.112 On these grounds, the court allowed the
private nuisance claim to move forward and stated that further litigation
would reveal whether sufficient facts supported the element of “substantial
contribution.”113 The private nuisance claim was effective because under the
substantial participation theory of private nuisance, the plaintiffs could show
that Aventis not only had a duty to prevent the nuisance, but that Aventis had
the ability to mitigate the nuisance.114

105
Id. at 847 (stating the court may not rule in a motion to dismiss on whether the
facts alleged equaled “substantial contribution,” but ruling that the allegations were sufficient
to state a private nuisance claim).
106
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
107
Id. at 844–45 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979)).
108
Id. at 845–46.
109
Id. at 845 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 (1979)).
110
Id. at 847.
111
Id.
112
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (citing to Young v. Bryco Arms, 736
N.E.2d 1, 14 (Ill. Ct. App.2001).
113
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 (1979) (“[o]ne is subject
to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but
also when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on”).
114
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
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v. Public Nuisance
The corn’s allergenic nature allowed the plaintiffs to successfully
plead the elements of public nuisance.115 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.”116 The court determined that the public had a
right to a food supply free from unapproved substances.117 The plaintiffs also
had to show “that they have been harmed differently than the general public”
in order to have a private action.118 Here, the plaintiffs experienced “physical
harm to chattels” and “pecuniary loss to business,” which was
distinguishable from the harm to the general public.119 The claim survived
the motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs demonstrated that while their
damages stemmed from the same nuisance, the damages were
distinguishable.120
vi. Conversion
Meeting the necessary elements of conversion is difficult for
plaintiffs in these cases, as demonstrated by the dismissal of the conversion
claim in Starlink Corn.121 Generally, the elements of conversion are (i)
intentional control over a chattel, (ii) serious interference with another’s right
of the chattel, such that (iii) justice requires compensation.122 The Starlink
Corn plaintiffs did not have a strong argument for conversion. The court
found the plaintiffs’ interference argument insufficient because the plaintiffs
still had “possession” and “total control over the corn.”123 The court
determined that while the market was “less hospitable,” the corn was “still
viable…for sale on the open market,” thus the product’s “essential character”

115
Id. at 848 (noting that releasing the corn with a limited registration presented a
nuisance to the public because it contaminated the food supply).
116
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). The Restatement of Torts
lists circumstances under which an interference could be deemed unreasonable: (a) [w]hether
the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the
public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience; or (b) whether the conduct is
proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is of
a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right”
117
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
118
Id. The court was careful to note that the harm experienced by the plaintiffs
must actually be entirely different from that experienced by the general public. Id. For
example, a mere “difference in severity” of harm is not a different harm. Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 848 (noting that the public experienced a contaminated food supply,
whereas farmers experienced a decrease in prices and lost profits).
121
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844 (dismissing claim for conversion).
122
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1979)).
123
Id. (noting that a chattel can be converted simply through alteration and not by
total dominion).
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was not changed.124 The court felt that the “decrease in market price” could
“arguably constitute a trespass to chattels,” but the plaintiffs failed to plead
as such.125
Furthermore, because the plaintiffs did not allege that Aventis
intended to exert control over the corn, they failed to demonstrate “an
intentional exercise of dominion.” 126 The court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that intent should be inferred from Aventis’ negligence on the
grounds that intent, by its nature, does not arise through negligence.127
vii. State Consumer Protection Acts: The North Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act
Claims under consumer protection statutes may also be a viable
option for farmers and agribusinesses seeking relief.128 However, because
plaintiffs in these class actions come from many different states, standing as
a national class under a state’s consumer protection law has proven
difficult.129 In Starlink Corn, the plaintiffs failed to establish standing under
the NCUTPA, but they did have standing under the TCPA.130 Whether the
plaintiffs had standing was a matter of statutory interpretation.131 The court
pointed out that it was necessary for a named plaintiff to “show personal
injuries to state a claim” and that none of the named plaintiffs were from
North Carolina and the named plaintiffs did not allege that they conducted
business in North Carolina.132 The plaintiffs argued that “[b]ecause Aventis
is headquartered in North Carolina,” North Carolina was the center of any
unfair practices.133 However, the court cited to authorities that showed that
the plaintiffs must show an in-state injury to have standing to sue.134 Because
the plaintiffs had not pled any contacts with North Carolina or any in-person
harm in North Carolina, their NCUTPA claim failed.135
In contrast, the plaintiffs established standing under the TCPA
because the statute’s broad language included “Aventis’ licensing of its

124

Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844 (“At worst, StarLink contamination
changed plaintiff’s yield from being corn fit for human consumption to corn fit only for
domestic or industrial use.”).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See, e.g., id. at 848–852.
129
Id. at 833, 848–852.
130
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 848–852.
131
Id. at 848 (“[T]he dispute here, however, is not over whether any particular
practice is illegal under the statute, but the statute’s geographic reach.”).
132
Id. (holding that named plaintiffs cannot rely on unnamed plaintiffs to show
harm).
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 849–51.
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StarLink process to seed growers.”136 The plaintiffs had standing as third
parties harmed by Aventis’ deceptive practices, despite no direct engagement
in commercial transactions with Aventis in Tennessee.137
Starlink Corn is notable for the clear damage done by Aventis to
both farmers and to the general public.138 Aventis failed to adequately
instruct the farmers of the restrictions on the StarLink corn and failed to
instruct them and support them in keeping the corn away from the food
market.139 Aventis’ negligent actions were more egregious in light of the
potential allergenic nature of the corn, the EPA’s repeated refusal to
deregulate the corn and the EPA’s repeated imposition of new regulations on
the corn.140 These facts combined to make the plaintiffs’ claims for
negligence, and private and public nuisance especially effective.141
Additionally, Starlink Corn demonstrates the struggle for plaintiffs to show
they have standing under state consumer protection statutes.142
C. LibertyLink Rice: “Experimental Use Only” Rice Found in the U.S.
Rice Supply
1. The Facts of LibertyLink Rice
Another case, LibertyLink Rice, developed shortly after the Starlink
Corn case and involved the same seed company.143 In this case, the
defendant’s genetically engineered crop was only approved for limited
experimental use, but it somehow ended up in the U.S. rice supply.144
Aventis developed LibertyLink Rice in the early 1990s to resist Aventis’
“Liberty” herbicide, consisting of glufosinate.145 LibertyLink Rice came in

136

Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 849–51.
Id. at 851–52.
138
See supra text accompanying notes 66–70(discussing the StarLink
contamination of the human food supply and the resulting havoc on corn prices).
139
See supra text accompanying notes 48–62 (discussing the EPA restrictions for
StarLink corn and how Aventis failed to inform farmers of the restrictions).
140
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the EPA’s concerns
about the allergenic nature of the corn).
141
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
142
See supra text accompanying notes 117–27 (discussing the plaintiffs’ efforts to
establish standing under the NCTPA and the TCPA).
143
In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(multidistrict litigation).
144
See infra text accompanying notes 149–53 (explaining that LibertyLink Rice
was only approved for experimental use but was discovered in the U.S. rice supply).
145
Joshua B. Cannon, Statutory Stones and Regulatory Mortar: Using Negligence
Per Se to Mend the Wall Between Farmers Growing Genetically Engineered Crops and Their
Neighbors, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 653, 672 (2010) (arguing that the USDA should
promulgate regulations that would serve as a standard of care for negligence per se claims);
see also A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, The Common Law of Biotechnology And
Economic Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 133 (2008) (arguing that while there are
137
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four strains, two of which were never approved by the USDA but
contaminated the markets. 146 Aventis, pursuant to its experimental use
permit from the USDA, had been doing field research trials with the LLRICE
601 strain since December of 1998. 147 Bayer CropScience bought Aventis in
2001 as the field trials were ending.148
Although LLRICE 601 was only approved for experimental use, in
January 2006, rice purchaser and exporter Riceland Cooperative discovered
traces of LLRICE 601 in the rice in its warehouses.149 Bayer reported this
find to the USDA, which conducted an investigation.150 In 2007, the other
unapproved strain, LLRICE 604, was found in more rice samples, instigating
more investigations by the USDA.151 On February 20, 2007, the USDA said
it would take no enforcement actions against Bayer because it could not
determine how the rice ended up in the U.S. food supply.152 The USDA
deregulated LL601 and approved it for all uses in November 2006.153
However, the knowledge that this unapproved genetically engineered
crop had been circulating in the U.S. rice supply caused significant damage
to the U.S. rice market.154 Japan halted imports of U.S. long-grain rice, and
the European Union started purity testing all rice from the United States.155
Other countries restricted their imports of U.S. rice.156 This decline in
demand for U.S. rice was arguably related to the price of rice dropping.157
Farmers and various businesses in the rice industry filed lawsuits
against Bayer to recover the money they lost because of the weak price of
signs of policy changes for the regulation of genetically engineered crops, plaintiffs will have
to primarily rely on litigation for resolution of their claims).
146
See Cannon, infra note 145, at 672 (noting that Aventis obtained commercial
approval for LLRICE06 and LLRICE62).
147
See Endres, supra note 145, at 133 (explaining that Aventis did not seek
commercial approval for LLRICE601 as it was conducting the field trials).
148
See Cannon, supra note 145, at 672–73; see also Endres supra note 145, at
134; CNN, Bayer Buys CropScience, supra note 48 (explaining that Aventis CropScience was
acquired by Bayer, Inc. in 2001 and is now known as Bayer CropScience, Inc.).
149
Endres, supra note 145, at 134.
150
Cannon, supra note 145, at 673 (noting that the investigation “required 8,500
staff hours in eleven states and Puerto Rico”).
151
Id. (noting that the investigation suggested that the contamination was probably
not caused by cross-pollination).
152
USDA, Report of LibertyLink Rice Incidents, available at http://www.
aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/printable/RiceReport10-2007.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 19, 2015) (summarizing the USDA response to the LibertyLink Rice scenario).
153
Cannon, supra note 145, at 673 (noting that the USDA decided that the
LLRICE601 posed no health risks to humans).
154
Master Consol. Amended Class Action Compl. at ¶ 110, In re Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811-CDP, (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2009), available
at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mdl/06-1811/1010.pdf
[hereinafter
LibertyLink Rice Compl.] (noting damages to farmers, including an approximate $150 million
loss because of the decline in rice prices from simply August 21-22, 2006).
155
Cannon, supra note 145, at 673–74.
156
Cannon, supra note 145, at 674.
157
Id.
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rice.158 When Bayer agreed to a $750 million settlement in July 2011, “scores
of lawsuits” were pending against it in state and federal courts.159 The
settlement terms provided that it would become effective once over 85% of
those farmers injured by Bayer’s actions opted into the settlement.160
2. The Bellwether Trials
The settlement for LibertyLink Rice came after the conclusion of the
five bellwether trials from LibertyLink Rice, the multi-district litigation
action in the Federal District Court sitting in the Eastern District of Missouri
in December 2006.161 Judge Catherine Perry set the five bellwether trials as
examples for the various state and federal lawsuits.162 The trials included
cases from Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas.163 Three
of those cases resulted in verdicts in favor of the farmers.164 Bayer settled
158
Id. Lawsuits were also filed naming Riceland, a large rice cooperative who had
discovered the rice contamination, as a defendant. Endres, supra note 145, at 134–35.
159
Bloomberg News, Bayer Settles with Farmers Over Modified Rice Seeds, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/busi
ness/02rice.html?_r=0 (reporting on the settlement agreement).
160
MDL Settlement Agreement at 5, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No.
4:06 MD 1811-CDP (E.D. Mo., July 2011), available at http://gmricesettlement.com/BY_UnSecure/MDL_Settlement_Agreement.pdf [hereinafter LibertyLink Rice Settlement
Agreement] (defining an eligible claimant).
161
Transfer Order at 2, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 466 F.Supp. 2d
1351(E.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2006), No. 4:06 MD 01811-CDP, available at
http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mdl/061811/406MD1811CDP%20Doc1%20MDL%20ORDER.pdf [hereinafter LibertyLink Transfer
Order] (transferring litigation over the LibertyLink rice contamination to the Eastern District
of Missouri); see also David Bennett, GM Rice: Settlement Construction and Farmer Options,
DELTA Farm Press (July 3, 2011), available at http://deltafarmpress.com/rice/gm-ricesettlement-construction-and-farmer-options (discussing the bellwether process in this case).
“A bellwether trial is a case that the court and the parties select to test their arguments, with
the goal of moving the overall litigation towards resolution.”What Is a Bellwether Trial,
LIEFF,
CABRASER,
HEIMANN
&
BERNSTEIN,
available
at
http://www.
lieffcabraser.com/Personal-Injury/What-is-a-Bellwether-Trial.shtml (last visited Apr. 17,
2015).
162
Mem. & Order at 1, Penn v. Bayer CropScience LP (E.D. Mo. 2010), No. 4:06
MD 1811 CDP (Second Bellwether Trial), available at http://www.moed.uscourt
s.gov/sites/default/files/mdl/06-1811/3181.pdf [hereinafter Second Bellwether Trial Order]
(referring parties to the memorandum from the first bellwether trial for further guidance).
163
LibertyLink Transfer Order, supra note 161, at 1.
164
Mem. & Order at 1, Bell v. Bayer CropScience LP (E.D. Mo. 2010), No. 4:06
MD 1811 CDP (First Bellwether Trial) available at http://www.moed.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/mdl/06-1811/3180.pdf [hereinafter First Bellwether Trial Order]
(refusing to grant new trial to defendant after judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs);
Mem. & Order at 1, Second Bellwether Trial Order (refusing to grant new trial to defendant
after judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs); Amended Judgment at 1–2, Deshotels Farm
Mgmt. v. Bayer CropScience LP (E.D. Mo. 2010), No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (Fourth
Bellwether Trial), available at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mdl/061811/3329.pdf [hereinafter Fourth Bellwether Trial Judgment] (entering judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs).
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individually with the plaintiffs in one of the final two bellwether trials, and
finally included the plaintiffs in the last bellwether trial in a final $750
million settlement with all of the eligible rice farmers.165
The claims in the bellwether trials were very similar to each other.166
The bellwether trials included claims for negligence, negligence per se,
public and private nuisance and fraud under their respective state statutes.167
The plaintiffs in the trials also brought claims for violations of the NCUTPA
and tried to impose liability on a negligence per se theory for violating the
FPPA.168 Judge Perry produced two memoranda after the first two bellwether
trials to detail her decisions in order to provide guidance for the other
trials.169 The memoranda from these cases discuss the claims in general terms
and avoid the temptation to become overly immersed in the intricacies of the
numerous individual state statutes.170
i. The Economic Loss Doctrine Did Not Limit Plaintiffs’ Recovery of
Damages
Missouri recognizes the economic loss doctrine in some scenarios.171
However, Judge Perry held that the doctrine did not apply to this case
because there was no contract between the parties, and the farmers were “not
claiming damage” to any allegedly defective product; they were claiming
“market losses and damage to other property,” permissible damages under
the economic loss doctrine.172 Thus, because the doctrine did not apply, the
plaintiffs’ recoverable damages were not limited.173
165
165
Order on Joint Motion to Dismiss at 1–3, Riviana Foods Inc. v. Bayer
CropScience LP (E.D. Mo. 2010), No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP (Third Bellwether Trial), available
at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mdl/06-1811/2987.pdf [hereinafter Third
Bellwether Trial Dismissal] (dismissing case); see also Allison Grande, How They Won It:
Wolf, Gray Notch $750M for Rice Farmers, LAW360.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/263617/how-they-won-it-wolf-gray-notch-750m-for-ricefarmers (providing additional information in a report on the final settlement).
166
Mem. & Order at 2–3, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig. (E.D. Mo. 2009),
No. 4:06 MD 1811-CDP, available at http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/mdl/06-1811/2075.pdf [hereinafter LibertyLink Rice Dec. 9 Op.] (ruling on summary
judgment motion of the second bellwether trial and discussing claims); In re Genetically
Modified Rice Litig., 666 F. Supp.2d. 1004, 1015, (E.D. Mo. 2009), No. 4:06 MD 1811-CDP
[hereinafter LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op.] (discussing claims).
167
Id.
168
LibertyLink Rice Dec. 9 Op., supra note 167, at 2 (discussing claims).
169
The first memorandum was the October 9, 2009, order ruling on the summary
judgment motions in the first bellwether trial. LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 167.
Judge Perry’s Memorandum and Order of Dec. 9, 2009 ruled on the summary judgment
motions in the Second Bellwether Trial. See LibertyLink Rice Dec. 9 Op., supra note 167.
170
Mem. & Order at 3, 12, Second Bellwether Trial Order, No. 4:06 MD 1811
CDP (E.D. Mo. 2010) (referring parties to the memorandum from the first bellwether trial for
more detailed analysis of law).
171
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 166, at 1016.
172
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 166 1016–17; see also Starlink Corn,
212 F. Supp.2d at 838 (ruling that recovery is possible when there is harm to “some property
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ii. Negligence Per Se
Negligence per se allows a party’s negligence to be “established as a
matter of law,” that is, a party’s actions violating a statute or regulation are
deemed negligent per se.174 The plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims for
violations of various state statutes and the FPPA regulations did not survive
summary judgment.175
In the various bellwether trials, the plaintiffs argued, first, FPPA
violations, and secondly, that the violations constituted negligence per se.176
The court disagreed, however, and held that the FPPA regulations do not
provide a standard of care and that there was “no evidence” that a violation
of the regulations would “create strict liability or a private right of action.”177
In other words, Bayer had violated the FPPA, but the violations did not lead
to a negligence per se claim.178
The plaintiffs’ state law negligence per se claims also failed because
the statutes required intentional conduct.179 The plaintiffs only accused Bayer
of negligent behavior, which, by definition, is not intentional.180 In sum, the
court held that even if the FPPA was violated, it did not constitute strict
liability, and secondly, that the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary
elements for negligence per se under their respective state statutes.181
iii. Negligence
The negligence claims went to trial for a jury determination of
Bayer’s standard of care and whether it was met.182 The court determined
that industry standards would be relevant in determining the appropriate
standard of care and that expert witnesses should be allowed to testify about
industry standards.183 The court held that the regulations and “regulatory
scheme,” did not establish a standard of care on their own, but should be

other than the product itself”); see also Sample v. Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1092–
94 (E.D.Mo.2003) (barring recovery of damages under economic loss doctrine pursuant to
Iowa and Illinois law).
173
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 166, at 1017.
174
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (10th ed. 2009) (defining “negligence per
se”).
175
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 166, at 1020.
176
Id. at 1021–22.
177
Id. at 1022.
178
Id. at 1022–23.
179
Id. at 1023 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 578.416, 537.353); LibertyLink Rice Oct.
9 Op., supra 167, at 1023.
180
Id. at 1023.
181
See supra text accompanying notes 161–66.
182
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra 167, at 1023–25 (ruling on the negligence
claim in the First Bellwether Trial).
183
Id.
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considered when determining a standard of care.184 More specifically, the
court held Bayer’s duty was to ensure that the people or companies it
employed to test and handle the rice did so properly.185
Judge Perry refused to allow Bayer to argue that the plaintiffs could
not prove proximate cause, because there was no intervening cause sufficient
to remove Bayer from the line of causation.186 Any negligent conduct was in
Bayer’s handling of the LibertyLink rice because Bayer was responsible for
the rice.187 Because Bayer was the party responsible for introducing the rice
into the environment, Bayer “had the duty to do so without negligence.”188
The risk of the rice escaping was a foreseeable risk that Bayer took upon
itself.189 Any negligence on the part of companies or employees hired by
Bayer to handle the rice was negligence “attributable to Bayer,” and not an
intervening cause.190
Ultimately, if Bayer negligently caused the contamination of the
U.S. rice supply, Bayer could not argue that other parties’ “failure to detect
the contamination” was an intervening cause breaking the chain of
causation.191 Any possible actions by other parties that spread or failed to
stop the contamination were “an entirely foreseeable and natural product of
the original negligence,” and not intervening causes of the damages
experienced by the plaintiffs.192
iv. Private and Public Nuisance Claims
As for the nuisance claims, Judge Perry allowed the private nuisance
claim to go forward to trial, but dismissed the public nuisance claims.193 The
public nuisance claims were dismissed because, absent evidence that the rice
was dangerous to the health of the public, the court could not find that
noncompliance with the EPA regulations “posed a danger to public health
and safety.”194 Under Missouri law, a public nuisance is “an offense against
the public order and economy of the state that violates the public’s right to
life, health, and the use of property, while, at the same time annoys, injures,
endangers, renders insecure, interferes with, or obstructs the rights or

184
Id. at 1023–24 (adding that “compliance or noncompliance with the
regulations” did not determine liability).
185
Id. at 1024.
186
Id. at 1024–25.
187
Id. at 1024.
188
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra 167, at 1024.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1024–25.
192
Id. at 1024.
193
Id. at 1018–19.
194
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra 167, at 1018 (distinguishing StarLink corn,
which was not approved for human consumption).
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property of the whole community.”195 The plaintiffs failed to show that the
rice was harmful to the larger public.196
The court sent the private nuisance claim to trial because the
plaintiffs sufficiently pled the elements of private nuisance.197 Under
Missouri law, a private nuisance is, “‘the unreasonable, unusual, or unnatural
use of one’s property so that it substantially impairs the right of another to
peacefully enjoy his property.’”198 The court determined that at trial, a jury
could find that the LibertyLink rice contamination of the farmers’ crops
actually interfered with the farmers’ “enjoyment of their land.”199
v. North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the
NCUPTA.200 The plaintiffs did not have standing under the NCUPTA
because their claims did not “have a sufficient effect on North Carolina
businesses” for the act to apply to them.201 As in Starlink Corn, the judge
determined that an in-state injury was necessary to state a claim under the
NCUTPA.202 Specifically, the judge found that the NCUTPA required “an
in-state injury to a plaintiff’s in-state business operations.”203 Ultimately, the
NCUTPA protected residents of North Carolina.204 The plaintiffs, who
resided in many different states, did not have enough of a connection to
North Carolina or “arise mainly from North Carolina activities” to
successfully bring a claim under the NCUTPA.205
LibertyLink Rice is notable for the plaintiffs’ success against Bayer
despite the fact that the USDA declined to ascribe fault to Bayer.206 The
LibertyLink Rice plaintiffs convinced the judge and juries that Bayer acted
negligently; showing that negligence under state law is an effective claim,
although negligence per se under the FPPA is not.207

195

Id. at 1018.
Id.
197
Id. at 1019.
198
Id. at 1018.
199
Id. at 1019.
200
LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra note 167 at 1018.
201
Id. at 1018.
202
Id. at 1017.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1017–18.
206
USDA,
Report
of
LibertyLink
Rice
Incidents,
available
at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2007/10/content/printable/RiceReport102007.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2015) (summarizing the USDA response to the LibertyLink rice
scenario).
207
See supra Part II.2.B–C (discussing the negligence claims in LibertyLink Rice).
196
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D. Syngenta Corn: Farmers Learn Too Late China Does Not Want
Agrisure Corn
Currently, Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn are the genetically
engineered crops making litigation waves. Syngenta, the proprietor of
Agrisure Viptera corn, sold the corn seed without informing farmers that the
seed was not approved for import by China, a major export market for
corn.208 Agrisure Viptera corn, approved by the U.S. government since 2010,
is genetically engineered to be insect-resistant.209 Much like StarLink corn,
Agrisure Viptera is regulated by the EPA as a pesticide.210
1. The Facts of Syngenta Corn
Approved for all uses by the EPA in 2010, Syngenta began selling
Agrisure Viptera, with its distinguishing MIR162 gene trait, to farmers in
2010 for the 2011 crop year.211 Some countries approved Agrisure Viptera
for import, but China did not.212 Syngenta did not inform its customers that
China would not accept the corn, fearing that the information would decrease
sales of Agrisure Viptera corn seed.213 Historically, China is not a major
importer of foreign corn, but China dramatically increased its imports of U.S.
corn in 2011–2012 crop season.214 Farmers and exporters who relied on this
market were upset when China begin to reject loads of corn in November
2013 for containing Viptera corn.215 Industry insiders speculated that China
208

David Ranii, Syngenta Faces Lawsuits Over Genetically Modified Corn,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://www.newsobserver.
com/2014/10/27/4269355/syngenta-faces-lawsuits-over-genetically.html
(reporting
that
“Syngenta generated $14.7 billion in worldwide sales last year, including $3.2 billion in seed
sales.”).
209
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., 820 F.Supp.2d. 953, 958 (N.D.
Iowa 2011) (noting that Syngenta began selling Agrisure Viptera corn in August of 2010).
210
Bunge, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 958 (noting the registration of Agrisure Viptera as a
pesticide).
211
See News Release: Syngenta Receives Chinese Import Approval for Agrisure
(Dec.
22,
2014),
available
at
Viptera
Corn
Trait,
SYNGENTA
http://www.syngentacropprotection.com/News_releases/news.aspx?id=187482
(reporting
approval by China of the MIR162 trait in 2014).
212
Bunge, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (discussing China’s zero-tolerance policy).
213
Pls.’ First Am. Class Action Compl. at 2, Five Star Farms v. Syngenta AG, No.
2:14-cv-02571-JWL-JPO (D. Kan. 2014) [hereinafter Five Star Farms Compl.] (citing the
testimony of a Syngenta official in Bunge who testified that Syngenta planned to
commercialize Agrisure Viptera and Duracade with or without China’s approval).
214
See Jacob Bunge, U.S. Corn Exports to China Dry Up over GMO Concerns,
WSJ,
Apr.
11,
2014
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
303873604579493790405023808 (reporting on the negative effect of Viptera corn to the
recently growing Chinese export market).
215
Kristine A. Tidgren, Syngenta Litigation Still Pending Despite China’s Viptera
Approval, IOWA STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR AGRIC. LAW & TAXATION (Dec. 27, 2014),
http://www.calt.iastate.edu/article/syngenta-litigation-still-pending-despite-chinas-vipteraapproval (reporting that China began rejecting the corn in November of 2013); Bunge, 820 F.
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rejected the corn because its domestic corn crop had increased and it was
difficult for Chinese corn growers to compete with the low prices of the
imported foreign corn.216 China continued to refuse to approve Viptera for
importation until December 22, 2014.217
Despite clear signals that China would not approve the MIR162
gene, Syngenta moved forward in 2014 with its commercialization of
Agrisure Duracade corn, which also contained the MIR162 gene.218
Estimates of the economic damage stemming from China’s rejection vary,
but the National Grain and Feed Association conjectured in April 2014 that
the rejected shipments came “to nearly 1.45 million metric tons,” causing
grain companies to lose about $427 million, and further estimates put the
damages at over $1 billion.219 On April 16, 2015, the association claimed in
an economic assessment analysis that “positive detections of MIR 162 . . .
has virtually halted U.S. corn trade with China.”220
Because farmers and agribusinesses did not know that China had not
approved Agrisure Viptera for import, they did not take precautions, such as
utilizing field buffer zones, to prevent the mixing of Agrisure Viptera corn
with other corn.221 As a result, Agrisure Viptera corn was present in
essentially the entire U.S. corn supply, contaminating it in the eyes of the
Chinese government.222 Much U.S. corn was sold for reduced prices or was

Supp. 2d at 963 (discussing the angry reactions of farmers, including increased phone calls
and emails to Syngenta and canceled orders).
216
Reuters, Syngenta Awaits China’s Approval For Gene-Modified Corn,
AGWEEK.COM (Jan. 8, 2014, 11:02 AM),http://www.agweek.com/event/article/id/22430/
(citing to “industry sources” who believe China’s rejection of the corn was for protectionist
reasons); but see Tim Maverick, China to Become World’s No. 1 Corn Importer,
WALLSTREETDAILY.COM (May 18, 2014), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2014/05/18/chinacorn/ (arguing that China’s rejection of corn was due to because the increased standard of
living and desire to eat meat from corn fed animals).
217
Syngenta Receives Chinese Import Approval supra note 211.
218
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 46.
219
Max Fisher, Lack of Chinese Approval for Import of U.S. Agricultural
Products Containing Agrisure Viptera MIR 162: A Case Study on Economic Impacts in
Marketing Year 2013/14, NAT’L GRAIN & FEED ASS’N (Apr. 16, 2014) 1, 1–3, available at
http://ngfa.org/wp-content/uploads/Agrisure-Viptera-MIR-162-Case-Study-An-EconomicImpact-Analysis.pdf-3 (studying “the ramifications of commercialization of crop
biotechnology prior to gaining approvals in major U.S. export markets.”). The National Grain
and Feed Association also estimated that the harm ranged from $1 billion to $2.9 billion. Five
Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 3.
220
Fisher, supra note 219, at 2.
221
See Bunge, 820 F. Supp.2d at 958 (relating how Syngenta even encouraged
farmers to plant non-Agrisure Viptera corn side by side with Agrisure Viptera corn,
essentially ensuring cross pollination).
222
Simmons
Hanly
Conroy,
Syngenta
Corn
Farmers
Lawsuit,
http://www.simmonsfirm.com/complex-litigation/gmo-corn-seed-lawsuits/syngenta-cornfarmer-lawsuits/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (stating that “[b]ecause of Syngenta’s failure to
control how Viptera® corn was planted, the Viptera® corn trait cross pollinated with fields of
non-Viptera® corn and introduced MIR 162 into the U.S. general corn supply.”).
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even destroyed, and many parties blamed Syngenta for corn prices dropping
by half since the summer of 2012.223
Consequently, numerous lawsuits were filed against Syngenta.224
Several of these lawsuits were consolidated as —Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn
Litigation—the multidistrict action pending in the U.S. Federal District Court
of Kansas.225 Syngenta Corn is a consolidation of two class actions which
were both filed on November 11, 2014: (1) Five Star Farms, Frahm
Farmland, Inc., v. Syngenta AG, filed in the U.S. District Court, Eastern
District of Missouri; and (2) Wilson Farm Inc. v. Syngenta AG, filed in the
U.S. District Court, District of Kansas. 226 Currently, Syngenta Corn is still in
the middle of preliminary preparations for trial.227
While no complaint has been filed for Syngenta Corn, the plaintiffs
in the underlying actions that make up Syngenta Corn filed complaints on
December 18, 2014, before their cases were transferred and consolidated.228
These complaints provide a basic idea of the direction the legal claims in the
litigation will take.

223

Tidgren, supra note 215.
See id. Cargill filed a lawsuit against Syngenta on September 12, 2014. Mark
Klein, Cargill Sues Syngeta Over Unapproved Corn Trait, CARGILL.COM (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.cargill.com/news/releases/2014/NA31686255.jsp. Trans Coastal Supply Company
(an exporter) also sued Syngenta. Jacob Bunge, Grain Shipper Files for Bankruptcy, Citing
Biotech-Corn
Battle,
WSJ.COM
(July
14,
2015)
available
at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/grain-shipper-files-for-bankruptcy-citing-biotech-corn-battle1437767340. Archer Daniels Midland Company (which owns over 200 grain elevators) also
filed a lawsuit against Syngenta. Sabrina Canfield, Archer Daniels Midland Says GMO Corn
is Killing Exports to China, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/11/24/archer-daniels-midland-says-gmo-corn-iskilling-u-s-exports-to-china.htm (reporting on the various cases filed against Syngenta).
Syngenta sued Bunge North America, Inc., a warehouse operator, for Bunge’s refusal to
accept Viptera corn. Bunge, 820 F.Supp.23d at 958.
225
Transfer Order, In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litigation, MDL No. 2591
(J.P.M.L. 2014), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/MDL-2591Initial_Transfer-12-14.pdf [hereinafter Syngenta Corn Transfer Order] (ordering consolidation
of the cases).
226
Id. Other tag-along cases were also consolidated into this MDL. Id.
227
See Order Concerning Appointment of Counsel, In re Syngenta AG MIR162
Corn
Litigation,
MDL
No.
2591
(D.
Kan.
2015),
available
at
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/order-concerning-appointment-of-counsel-doc-67/ (appointing
counsel as of January 22, 2015).
228
Pls.’ First Am. Class Action Compl., Wilson Farm Inc. v. Syngenta AG, No.
4:14-cv-01908
RWS
(E.D.
Mo.
2014),
available
at
http://www.syngentacornlitigation.com/portalresource/FirstAmendedClassActionComplantMissouri.pdf [hereinafter Wilson Farm Compl.] (stating claims); Five Star Farms Compl.,
supra note 213.
224
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2. The Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms Complaints Present the
Potential Legal Claims in Syngenta Corn
Overall, the complaints allege that Syngenta prematurely
commercialized Agrisure Viptera corn in spite of the known risk that it was
not approved by China, did nothing to ensure that the corn was channeled
away from the corn supply destined for China, and continued to sell Viptera
corn, as well as Duracade, while misrepresenting the status and importance
of Chinese approval.229 The Five Star Farms complaint alleged numerous
tort claims under various state laws.230 The complaints alleged violations of
the various state consumer protection acts and the federal Lanham Act,
which prohibits false advertising, and stated claims for negligence, trespass
to chattels, and private nuisance.231
The complaints defined the class of eligible plaintiffs as “all persons
and entities . . . who during the relevant time period, were corn producers in
the United States who did not purchase or plant Agrisure Viptera or
Duracade corn or corn sold with MIR162 and/or Event 5307 genetically
engineered corn traits, and sold their corn after November 18, 2013.”232 The
class specifically excluded farmers who had planted Agrisure Viptera or
Duracade because those farmers had potential contract claims, implicating
the economic loss doctrine, and precluding those farmers from seeking
market damages.233 Essentially, any farmer who grew corn, as long as it was
not Agrisure Viptera or Duracade corn could join in the class under the
theory that all farmers who sold corn, whether domestically or abroad, were
harmed by the low corn prices.234
The Wilson Farm class action classified the plaintiffs as a
Nationwide Corn Producers Class, and then separately as thirteen classes of
farmers from the thirteen different states.235 The complaint alleged violations
of the federal Lanham Act and the Minnesota consumer protection statutes
on behalf of the entire nationwide class.236 The tort claims for the various
state classes were negligence, tortious interference, trespass to chattels, and
private nuisance.237
229

Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 2–4.
Id. at 67, 81, 85, 93, 113, 116.
231
Id. at 71–88 (citing to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (The Lanham Act)). At the time of
Starlink Corn, there was a circuit split of authority relating to plaintiff standing under the
Lanham Act, which may be why a Lanham Act claim was not brought in Starlink Corn. The
Supreme Court of the United States resolved the circuit split in 2014, however. See Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
232
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 66.
233
Id.; see generally supra Part II.B.2.A (discussing the economic loss doctrine).
234
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213 at 66.
235
Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 69–70.
236
Id. at 69.
237
Id. at 80–121 (outlining plaintiffs’ negligence, tortious interference, and
trespass to chattels claims under various state laws). Tortious interference with business is a
tort claim unique to Syngenta Corn. Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 93, 95. The
230
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The Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms complaints strove to paint a
picture of reckless negligence on the part of Syngenta. For example, a major
factual foundation to the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and negligence claims
was Syngenta’s claims that it would take steps to channel the corn into the
appropriate commercial markets and away from China.238 In Syngenta’s
petition for deregulation, it claimed that the stewardship agreements with
farmers would require the farmers to channel the corn away from markets
where the corn was not approved.239 Syngenta also pledged to engage in a
“wide-ranging grower education campaign” that would teach farmers how to
properly channel their corn.240
In reality, the 2010 Stewardship Agreement Syngenta provided to
farmers contained no information on the issue and the 2011 Stewardship
Agreement merely asked the farmers to recognize that the corn “may” not be
approved for export to certain countries, without specifying China.241 The
Stewardship Agreements also told farmers they could expect to receive a
“Stewardship Guide” in the unspecified future and to watch for amendments
to the guide, which were promised to be made available either by paper or by
a website.242 Plaintiffs argued that the vague statements in the Stewardship
Agreements and the referrals to the website were certainly not the
educational campaign that Syngenta had promised.243
The complaints contained lengthy factual allegations that Syngenta’s
irresponsible rush to commercialize the corn was in stark contrast to
Syngenta’s repeated public commitments to industry and company standards
of stewardship.244 Syngenta belonged to many industry groups that published
statements and policies recognizing the importance of caution in
commercializing new genetically engineered crops.245 Syngenta’s paper
claim was brought by the North Dakota and Oklahoma plaintiffs under their respective state
laws. Id. It is not discussed at length in this article because it was only brought by two state
classes. Id.
238
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 21–24.
239
Id. at 23.
240
Id. (citing MIR162 Deregulation Petition Subsection IX.D).
241
Id. at 36–37.
242
Id. at 36.
243
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 36.
244
Id. at 11–19.
245
Id. at 13–15. Examples of Syngenta’s public commitments to stewardship
include memberships in Biotechnology Industry Organization, CropLife International, and
Excellence Through Stewardship. Id. at 13–17. These groups have publically stated that a
violation of the zero-tolerance policies of many foreign countries would cause major
disruption to trade. Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 13. Additionally, Syngenta’s
own foundation, The Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, notes the clear risk of
trade disruption if a foreign country has not approved a genetically engineered crop and cites
stewardship as a way to avoid any disruption to trade. Id. at 17; see also Syngenta Foundation
for Sustainable Agriculture, Public-Private Partnerships: An Experience Based Tool for
Practitioners, SYNGENTA FOUND., available at http://www.syngentafoundation.or
g/index.cfm?pageID=703 (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (stating under “Biosafety legislation and
liability” that, “until a country issues a registration approval for cultivation and/or food and/or

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss3/6

30

Holm: When They Don't Want Your Corn

2015]

WHEN THEY DON'T WANT YOUR CORN

587

commitment to stewardship appears especially fake in light of the fact that in
Syngenta v. Bunge, Syngenta confessed that it had planned to sell the corn
regardless of approval from China.246
3. The Legal Claims
i. Negligence
State by state classes of plaintiffs brought negligence claims under
their respective state laws.247 The numerous state statutes for negligence in
the complaints were not identical, but the factual allegations under the
statutes were very similar, if not identical.248
The plaintiffs alleged that Syngenta was subject to a duty of
reasonable care, which it breached in many ways.249 To begin, the plaintiffs
claimed that Syngenta breached the duty of reasonable care by rushing to
commercialize Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn without informing
farmers of the “substantial risks that growing Viptera would lead to loss of
the Chinese market,” and by misleading the farmers about the importance of
the status of the Chinese approval process.250 Allegedly, Syngenta breached
its duty by failing to provide an effective stewardship program, and failing to
enforce the ineffectual program that it did have.251 Further, Syngenta
breached its duty of care when it sold the corn to farmers knowing that the
farmers were not properly informed or prepared to channel the corn to
appropriate trade markets, and failed to “adequately warn and instruct
farmers” of the “danger of contamination” of Agrisure Viptera corn with
other corn.252 The plaintiffs alleged that their damages were the drop in
market price of corn and the loss of the Chinese market for their corn.253
ii. Private Nuisance
As with the negligence claims, the plaintiffs in Five Star Farms and
Wilson Farm asserted claims for private nuisance as state classes of farmers
under their respective state statutes.254 The state statutes had similar
definitions of what constitutes a private nuisance, differing mostly in the area
feed consumption, there is a clear responsibility and liability, even if the government scientific
assessments show that there are no safety or environmental issues.”).
246
Bunge, 762 F3d at 796.
247
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213 at 78, 84, 87, 90, 94, 97.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 78.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at ¶236.
254
Id. at 85, 88, 91 (alleging private nuisance claims under Kansas, Nebraska and
North Dakota law); Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 81, 85, 96 (alleging private
nuisance claims under Alabama, Arkansas, and Minnesota state law).
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of the level of intent required to show defendant’s interference with
plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their property.255 For example, the Kansas private
nuisance statute required grossly negligent or unreasonable conduct, whereas
the Nebraskan statute required an intentional and unreasonable invasion, or,
in the alternative, an unintentional invasion stemming from negligent or
reckless conduct.256 The plaintiffs argued that they have a claim for private
nuisance because Syngenta interfered with their “quiet use and enjoyment of
their land and/or property interests” by “contaminating the U.S. corn
supply.”257 According to the plaintiffs, this contamination occurred when
Syngenta offered Agrisure Viptera and Duracade for sale before it was
approved for import to China without proper precautionary measures.258
iii. Trespass to Chattels
The Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms plaintiffs also included
claims for trespass to chattels under various state statutes, claims which were
untested in both Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice.259 Intent is the key
element in a trespass to chattels claim.260
The plaintiffs sought to prove that, by prematurely commercializing
its corn and failing to provide “adequate systems to isolate and channel it,”
Syngenta intended to intermingle Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn with
non-Agrisure Viptera and non Duracade corn.261 Without a way to keep the
Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn separate, Syngenta must have known
that it was a “substantial certainty” that the U.S. corn supply would be
contaminated.262 The plaintiffs argued that because Syngenta had this
knowledge, it “intended to intermeddle” with the plaintiffs’ corn, in which
the plaintiffs had possession or rights of possession.263 The contamination
allegedly resulted in the impaired condition, quality, or value of the corn.264
The success of this claim in Syngenta Corn and future cases will heavily
255

Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213 at 85, 88.
Id.
257
Id. at 85.
258
Id. at ¶¶ 26–29.
259
Id. at 82, 86, 89, 94, 96, 98, 101, 104, 111, 114, 117, 120 (alleging trespass to
chattels under Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin state laws); Wilson Farm Compl., supra
note 228, at 12, 86, 89, 94, 96, 98, 101, 104, 111, 114, 117, 120 (alleging trespass of chattels
under Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin state laws); Part II.B.2 (noting the legal
claims in Starlink Corn); Part II.C.2 (noting the legal claims in LibertyLink Rice).
260
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965) (“intentionally (a)
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the
possession of another.”); Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 83–84, 88–89, 92, 96,
98.
261
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 83.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Id. at 89.
256
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depend on the ability of the plaintiffs’ ability to prove the defendants
intended to interfere with the plaintiffs’ ownership interest in the crop.
iv. The Lanham Act and State Consumer Protection Statutes
In a departure from the history of Starlink Corn and LibertyLink
Rice, the plaintiffs in Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms sought damages for
the violation of the federal Lanham Act.265 The Lanham Act, which provides
a civil remedy, prohibits false advertising.266 The act provides for monetary
and injunctive relief.267 The plaintiffs alleged that Syngenta made false and
misleading representations in regards to the timeline for Agrisure Viptera
corn’s approval in China, Syngenta’s ability to channel the corn away from
China, and the severity of damage that would arise if China were to reject the
corn.268
Similar to Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice, the Wilson Farm and
Five Star Farms plaintiffs sought damages under state consumer protection
acts.269 However, the Five Star Farms plaintiffs departed from the other
cases by seeking damages as a nationwide class under the Minnesota
consumer protection and trade practices statutes.270 The past cases and
complaints where a nationwide or multiple state class of farmers sought
damages under a state consumer protection act were all based on the
NCUTPA or the TCPA.271 Perhaps because of the earlier instances of failure
to show standing under the NCUTPA, the Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm
plaintiffs sought out different statutes, notably the Minnesota Unlawful
Trade Practices Act (MUTPA).272
265

Id. at 71.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1946) (“(a) Civil action (1) Any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which-- (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.”).
267
See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (injunctive relief); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (monetary relief).
268
Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213, at 73–74.
269
Starlink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 848–52, LibertyLink Rice Oct. 9 Op., supra
167 at 1018, Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 69, Five Star Farms Compl., supra note
213, at 67.
270
Id. at 67.
271
Supra text accompanying notes 120–27 (discussing Starlink Corn and the
NCUTPA and the TCPA); supra text accompanying notes 189–92 (discussing LibertyLink
Rice and the NCUTPA).
272
Wilson Farm Compl., supra note 228, at 69; Five Star Farms Compl., supra
note 213, at 67.
266
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MUTPA prohibits any person from misrepresenting the nature of
merchandise and from using fraud or misrepresentation to sell
merchandise.273 Whether the Five Star Farms plaintiffs have standing under
the MUTPA is impossible to ascertain at this point, but arguably the
language stating “no person” applies to non-Minnesotans.274
As Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm did not go to trial and were
instead consolidated into the pending Syngenta Corn litigation, the
allegations from these complaints may not be addressed in Syngenta Corn.275
Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm did, however, paint a picture of Syngenta
engaged in an irresponsible course of action that harmed farmers, and these
allegations, if true, may be sufficient to hold Syngenta accountable for
misrepresentation and negligence.276
III. ANALYSIS
This section compares the facts and claims in Starlink Corn,
LibertyLink Rice, and Syngenta Corn to argue that the most effective tort
claims for class action plaintiffs who wish to recover damages from seed
companies are claims based on negligence rather than intent, and claims that
do not require an element of intent or negligence, such as public and private
nuisance.277
A comparison of these cases reveals several clues as to the
effectiveness of plaintiffs’ tort claims. First, the definition of a class in a
class action has significant repercussions with regard to standing.278
Standing, as a threshold issue, is especially important and will likely be
rigorously contested. Secondly, the nature of the genetically engineered crop
has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the tort claims.279 Finally, and
273

MINN. STAT. § 325D.13 (2014) (stating that, “No person shall, in connection
with the sale of merchandise, knowingly misrepresent, directly or indirectly, the true quality,
ingredients or origin of such merchandise.”); see also The Minnesota Prevention of Consumer
Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat. § 325F.69 (2014) (stating that, “the act, use, or employment by
any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement
or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any
merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged
thereby, is enjoinable as provided in section 325F.70“).
274
MINN. STAT. § 325D.13 (2014).
275
Syngenta Corn Transfer Order, supra note 225 (ordering consolidation of the
cases).
276
Supra text accompanying notes 211–Error! Bookmark not defined.
(discussing the facts behind the Syngenta Corn litigation).
277
See infra text accompanying notes 267–87 (comparing and contrasting the
three cases); see infra text accompanying notes 310–65 (arguing that negligence and private
and public nuisance are the most effective claims for plaintiffs).
278
See infra text accompanying notes 285–92 (discussing importance of framing a
putative class).
279
See infra text accompanying notes 369–378 (arguing that the success of public
nuisance claims depends on whether the genetically engineered crop may have negative
effects on human health).
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this often comes in conjunction with the previous concept, the extent and
foundation of the regulations and trade restrictions on the genetically
engineered crop in question provide the basis for the plaintiffs arguments
about what was violated, what the seed companies knew, what the seed
companies should have known about the nature of the crop, and the effects of
violating the regulations or trade restrictions.280
The cases discussed supra, illustrate how difficult it is for plaintiffs
to connect the actions and knowledge of the seed companies with the harm
suffered by the plaintiffs.281 Simply by the nature of the two concepts,
proving negligence is always easier than proving intent.282 In these cases,
proving intent is especially difficult because the chain of causation from the
seed companies’ actions until the alleged damage is long and attenuated.283
Thus, the plaintiffs’ strategy to prove intent necessitates arguing that what
the seed company knew, should have known, and did know to create enough
inferences to connect to the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.284 Public and
private nuisance are also effective claims because they do not generally
include an element of intent and these cases lend themselves to facts that are
sufficient to meet the elements.285 Plaintiffs should be aware that public
nuisance will likely only be an effective remedy if the genetically engineered
crop in question has documented health risks for humans.286
A. Comparing StarLink Corn and LibertyLink Rice to Syngenta Corn
The facts of Syngenta Corn are similar to the facts of Starlink Corn
and LibertyLink Rice in some ways and quite distinct in others.287 Syngenta
Corn is similar to Starlink Corn in that, in both cases, the seed company was
allegedly not forthright and candid with its customers about the limitations
on the use of the genetically modified seed it was selling.288 Specifically, in
Starlink Corn, the seed company Aventis (now Bayer) failed to inform its
customers that its seed was not approved by the United States for human
280
See infra text accompanying notes 278–281 (demonstrating that whether the
genetically engineered crop violated its registration or other regulations significantly impacts
what claims will be more effective).
281
See supra Part II.B–D.
282
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 184–185.
283
See supra text accompanying notes 213–Error! Bookmark not defined.
(discussing the correlation between China’s rejection of corn and the drop of corn prices).
284
See infra text accompanying notes 343–346 (noting what Syngenta knew and
did not know in the Starlink Corn case).
285
See infra text accompanying notes 358–378 (discussing private and public
nuisance).
286
See infra text accompanying notes 373–376 (noting that plaintiffs in future
cases can cite to the success of private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn as support in cases
where the genetically engineered seed is not approved for human consumption).
287
See supra Part II.B–D.
288
See supra Part II.B., D. (discussing the facts of Syngenta Corn and Starlink
Corn).
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consumption.289 In Syngenta Corn, the seed company, Syngenta, did not
inform its customers that its seed was not approved by the Chinese
government for import into China.290 In both cases, the evidence supports the
position that the reticence in communication was not mere oversight or
accidental.291 In Starlink Corn, Aventis explained that its reason for not
informing customers of the restriction was that it thought the EPA would
change the restriction on the seed.292 Perhaps less culpably, in Syngenta
Corn, Syngenta advertised its corn as approved for major export markets,
when it knew that China (a recent major export market) would not accept it,
ostensibly because Syngenta thought it would get approval from China
later.293 However, there is also evidence that Syngenta did not care whether it
had Chinese approval.294
In contrast, the facts of LibertyLink Rice do not involve
misrepresentations by a seed company.295 The seed company, Bayer, had an
experimental permit from the USDA for LibertyLink rice and the evidence
seems to show that Bayer only used the rice in experimental plots.296
Although the rice got beyond the experimental plots and ended up in the U.S.
rice supply, Bayer never misrepresented any facts about the rice because
Bayer never offered the rice for sale.297
Syngenta Corn also differs from LibertyLink Rice and Starlink Corn
by the fact that Syngenta did not violate any U.S. regulations by
commercializing its corn.298 In LibertyLink Rice and Starlink Corn, the
genetically engineered crops violated their registrations.299Agrisure Viptera
and Duracade corn were simply not approved for import by China.300 Thus,

289

See supra text accompanying notes 57–59 (detailing Aventis’ failure to inform
farmers that StarLink was not approved for human consumption).
290
See Five Star Farms Compl., supra note 213.
291
See supra text accompanying note 61.
292
See supra text accompanying notes 57–59 (detailing Aventis’ failure to inform
farmers that StarLink was not approved for human consumption).
293
See supra text accompanying note 213 (noting Syngenta’s failure to inform
farmers that China would not accept Agrisure Viptera corn).
294
See supra note 213 (citing the testimony of a Syngenta official in Syngenta v.
Bunge who testified that Syngenta planned to commercialize Agrisure Viptera and Duracade
with or without China’s approval).
295
See supra Part II.C.1 (illustrating the facts of LibertyLink Rice).
296
See supra text accompanying notes 137–140 (describing the USDA
investigation that failed to show Bayer at fault).
297
See supra text accompanying notes 137–140 (noting the discovery of
LibertyLink rice in U.S. rice supply, but not as a result of sales).
298
See supra text accompanying note 213 (noting that the EPA approved Agrisure
Viptera corn for all uses).
299
See supra text accompanying notes 44–56 (describing the StarLink corn
restrictions and violations); see supra text accompanying note 149 (noting that LibertyLink
rice was only approved for experimental use, but the rice ended up in the U.S. rice supply).
300
See supra text accompanying notes 212, 218 (explaining that China had not
approved Agrisure Viptera or Duracade for import).
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the question of whether U.S. regulations were violated by Agrisure Viptera
and Duracade corn is a non-issue.
Another similarity between the cases is the composition of the
classes of plaintiffs.301 In Starlink Corn, only farmers who did not grow
StarLink corn were included in the class.302 By default, LibertyLink Rice
followed suit.303 In LibertyLink Rice, no farmers purchased Bayer’s rice
because it was not offered for sale, so any farmer who grew long grain rice
and could show market loss was eligible for the settlement money.304 The
current structure of the Syngenta Corn class action also limits the class of
plaintiffs to farmers who did not buy the Agrisure Viptera and Duracade
corn.305
B. Tort Claims
The importance of carefully crafting the class of plaintiffs is to
ensure that the plaintiffs can seek remedies under tort law and avoid having
their damages barred by the economic loss doctrine.306 According to the
economic loss doctrine, farmers with contracts must seek contract remedies
for their losses and cannot sue for market loss damages.307 The plaintiffs in
Syngenta Corn and in other future suits should also carefully craft their
classes of farmers. The classes must be very narrowly defined so that
plaintiffs’ tort claims are not barred by the economic loss doctrine.308
For example, the Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms complaints
carefully framed their classes of plaintiffs.309 Wilson Farm and Five Star
Farms did not include farmers who planted Agrisure Viptera or Duracade
301

See infra text accompanying notes 281–284 (noting the composition of the
classes in the three cases).
302
See supra text accompanying note 82 (noting the composition of the plaintiffs
in Starlink Corn).
303
See supra text accompanying 177 (explaining that LibertyLink rice was only
used by Aventis for experimental use).
304
See supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing the settlement with rice
farmers).
305
See supra text accompanying notes 232–234 (describing the exclusion of
farmers who grew Agrisure Viptera or Duracade corn from the eligible class of plaintiffs in
Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms).
306
See supra Part II.B.2.A (explaining the economic loss doctrine in the context of
the Starlink Corn claims).
307
See supra Part II.B.2.A (explaining application of economic loss doctrine to
Starlink Corn claims); supra Part II.C.2.A (explaining that the economic loss doctrine did not
limit plaintiff’s claims in LibertyLink Rice); supra Part II.D.3.A (explaining the effect of the
economic loss doctrine in Syngenta Corn).
308
See supra Part II.B.2.A (explaining the economic loss doctrine in the context of
the Starlink Corn claims); supra Part II.C.2.A (explaining that the economic loss doctrine did
not limit plaintiff’s claims in LibertyLink Rice); supra Part II.D.3.A. (explaining the effect of
the economic loss doctrine in Syngenta Corn).
309
See supra text accompanying notes 229–232 (describing the composition of the
plaintiff classes in Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms).
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because those farmers had contracts with Syngenta and would thus be barred
from recovering market loss damages by the economic loss doctrine.310
1. Negligence Per Se is an Ineffectual Claim Because it is Difficult to Find
a Statute Imposing Strict Liability for Violating Federal Regulations
Plaintiffs face a severe hurdle to when attempting to establish
negligence per se because they lack a statute that clearly ascribes strict
liability for the violation of the federal regulations concerning genetically
engineered crops.311 Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful asserting FIFRA, the
FPPA, or EPA and USDA violations to establish strict liability, and only
limited success in finding a state law that provides a negligence per se civil
remedy for violating these federal regulations.312 The negligence per se claim
based on violations of the FPPA in Starlink Corn survived the motion to
dismiss merely to the extent that the plaintiffs were given the opportunity to
show at a later time that they had a state law that imposed strict liability for
violating FIFRA.313 Whether the plaintiffs had such a state law available to
them never came to light because the parties settled.314 Attempts by plaintiffs
to argue that a defendant should be held strictly liable for violating FIFRA,
FPPA, or EPA and USDA regulations will probably never succeed. The case
law clearly holds that the FPPA does not provide for a standard of care, and
that there was no congressional intent for a violation of the regulations to
create strict liability.315
Plaintiffs have also been unsuccessful with their state law negligence
per se claims.316 For example, the LibertyLink Rice plaintiffs tried suing
under a Missouri statute.317 However, the plaintiffs were unable to plead all
the necessary elements required for a negligence per se claim.318 The

310
See supra text accompanying notes 229–233 (explaining the need to exclude
farmers with contracts).
311
See supra Part II.B.2.B (discussing the absence of a statute imposing strict
liability in Starlink Corn); supra Part II.C.2.B (discussing the absence of a statute imposing
strict liability in LibertyLink Rice).
312
Id.
313
See supra text accompanying notes 88–90 (discussing the court’s decision in
Starlink Corn to allow the plaintiffs to show later that a state law existed that created a civil
remedy for violations of FIFRA).
314
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that the court reserved
the determination of the existence of such a statute for later).
315
See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting the ruling in LibertyLink Rice
that the federal regulations do not provide for a standard of care).
316
See supra text accompanying notes 179 (explaining that the state negligence
per se claims in LibertyLink Rice failed because the state statutes did not provide a negligence
standard of care, but instead required intentional conduct).
317
See supra text accompanying note 179 (citing Missouri statutes used in
LibertyLink Rice).
318
See supra text accompanying notes 181 (discussing the plaintiffs’ failure to
plead necessary elements).
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Missouri statute required intentional conduct and the plaintiffs only alleged
negligent conduct.319
In consideration of these past failures, the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs
and other plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims are unlikely to be effective
unless they can find an appropriate state statute that either provides for strict
liability for violating the federal regulations, or prohibits in and of itself the
conduct of the defendants.320 Although more research could be done in this
area, the fact that the plaintiffs in LibertyLink Rice and Starlink Corn were
unable to find an effective statute in spite of having plaintiffs from across the
country, suggests that such a statute is rare.321
However, in the case of the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs, even finding
such a state statute would not ensure the success of a negligence per se
claim. The Syngenta Corn plaintiffs lack the argument that Syngenta violated
any federal regulations.322 Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn varieties were
approved in the United States and were in compliance with all regulations;
the problem was that the corn varieties were not approved in China.323
All things considered, negligence per se is not a strong claim for
plaintiffs at this time. Negligence per se could be a strong remedy for
plaintiffs if they could sue under a state statute that automatically makes a
seed company negligent if the company violates FIFRA, FPPA, or USDA
and EPA regulations and the seed company does in fact violate those
regulations.324 Plaintiffs could also seek out state negligence per se statutes
like the Missouri statute, but they must be able to satisfy the elements of
those statutes.325

319

See supra text accompanying note 179–180(noting that Missouri statutes
required intentional conduct).
320
See supra text accompanying notes 89–92 (discussing in Starlink Corn the
possibility of a state law creating a civil action for violation of federal regulations).
321
See supra text accompanying note 82 (describing the composition of Starlink
Corn plaintiffs); supra, text accompanying note 177 (explaining that LibertyLink Rice class
composition was from any rice farmer injured during the applicable time), supra Part II.B.2.A
(describing the composition of the Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm plaintiffs).
322
See supra text accompanying notes 191–192, 208–209 (explaining that
Agrisure Viptera corn was approved for use in the U.S. but was not approved by China for
import).
323
See supra text accompanying note 209 (explaining that Agrisure Viptera corn
was not approved by China for import).
324
See supra text accompanying notes 299–300 (arguing that a statute ascribing
liability is required to establish a negligence per se claim).
325
See supra text accompanying note 181 (explaining that the Missouri statutes §§
578.416, 537.353 prohibiting interference with or destruction of crops require intentional
conduct).
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2. Negligence is an Effective Claim if Plaintiffs Can Obtain a Favorable
Standard of Care
In contrast to negligence per se, negligence is an effective claim for
plaintiffs.326 The likely success of a negligence claim is demonstrated by the
fact that in Starlink Corn, the negligence claim survived the motion to
dismiss with some modifications, and in the LibertyLink Rice bellwether
trials, the plaintiffs won their cases primarily on the negligence claims.327
Of course, a key issue in negligence is the appropriate standard of
care that applies to the defendant.328 When a party’s duties are not clearly
spelled out in statutes, the appropriate standard of care is an issue for the
court to decide.329 The standard of care applied to the defendant can vary
from situation to situation and industry to industry.330 Courts determine the
standard of care that applies after considering all relevant authority, so the
Syngenta Corn plaintiffs should argue for a standard of care that gives
Syngenta a duty to U.S. farmers.331 As in LibertyLink Rice and Starlink Corn,
the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs are alleging that Syngenta owed them a duty
even though they did not buy the corn from Syngenta.332
Plaintiffs have significant precedent they can rely on to support their
claim that seed companies should be held to a high duty of care. In Wilson
Farm and Five Star Farms, the plaintiffs proposed a standard of duty based
on industry standards, Syngenta’s own sustainability standards, and state

326

See supra text accompanying notes 85–96 (describing the difficulty in pleading
a successful negligence per se claim in Starlink Corn); supra text accompanying notes 174–
181 (describing the dismissal of the negligence per se claim in LibertyLink Rice); supra text
accompanying note 102 (describing how the negligence claim survived the motion to dismiss
in Starlink Corn); supra text accompanying notes 164–165, 182–192 (discussing the success
of plaintiffs with their negligence claims in the LibertyLink Rice bellwether trials).
327
See supra text accompanying note 102 (describing how the negligence claim
survived the motion to dismiss in Starlink Corn); supra text accompanying notes 164–165
(discussing the success of plaintiffs in the LibertyLink Rice bellwether trials); supra text
accompanying 182–192 (discussing the negligence claims in the LibertyLink Rice bellwether
trials).
328
See supra text accompanying note 230 (discussing Starlink Corn’s use of the
Restatement (Second) of Tort’s definition of negligence); supra text accompanying note 98
(describing elements of negligence in Starlink Corn).
329
See supra text accompanying notes 97–104 (discussing court’s decision about
the standard of care in Starlink Corn and noting that it would be an issue at trial).
330
Id.
331
See supra text accompanying note 183 (describing how the court in LibertyLink
Rice utilized industry standards in determining an appropriate standard of care).
332
See supra text accompanying note 249 (discussing the Five Star Farms and
Wilson Farm plaintiffs’ allegations that Syngenta owed them a duty of reasonable care); supra
text accompanying notes 185–192 (noting that the court in LibertyLink Rice found that Bayer
had a duty to ensure its rice was handled properly and not negligently introduced into the
environment).
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statutes.333 The duty the court found in Starlink Corn was that Aventis had a
duty “to ensure that StarLink did not enter the human food supply.”334 In
LibertyLink Rice, the plaintiffs sued under various state negligence
statutes.335 The court considered the statutes as well as industry standards to
determine the standard of care for the defendant.336 For example, the court
held that because Bayer was responsible for the LL601 and LL604 rice
strains, it had the duty to prevent the known and foreseeable risk of
contamination and to introduce the strains into the environment without
negligence.337
Syngenta Corn plaintiffs should argue for a standard of care strict
enough to impose a substantial duty on Syngenta. Syngenta Corn plaintiffs
should not only use industry standards, but also Syngenta’s public
commitments to stewardship when arguing for a standard of care favorable to
the plaintiff’s chance of recovery.338 The plaintiffs have a good chance of
getting the court to consider Syngenta’s public commitments to stewardship
because Syngenta repeatedly spelled out and committed to those duties.339
Plaintiffs could also cite Starlink Corn for the applicable standard of care.340
Once the standard of care is established by the court, the plaintiffs will have
to show that the defendant breached its duty under the standard of care.341
Breach of duty, is of course, a factual issue for the jury.342 The facts
of Syngenta Corn give plenty of ammunition to a jury to find a breach. The
facts are clear that Syngenta knew the corn was not approved in China and
chose to sell it with the full knowledge that the corn would be directed
towards foreign markets, including China.343 Even worse, Syngenta did not
advertise the fact that the corn was not approved in China, omitting warnings
333

See supra text accompanying notes 229–246 (describing Syngenta’s failure to
abide by its commitments to stewardship standards in the context of determining a standard of
care).
334
See supra text accompanying note 100 (describing court’s ruling in regards to
Aventis’ duties in Starlink Corn).
335
See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiffs’ state law
claims in LibertyLink Rice).
336
See supra text accompanying note 183 (describing how the court in LibertyLink
Rice utilized industry standards to determine an appropriate standard of care).
337
See supra text accompanying notes 182–185 (detailing Bayer’s duty).
338
See supra text and notes accompanying notes 238–240 (describing Syngenta’s
public commitments to stewardship standards).
339
See supra text and notes accompanying notes 238–240 (describing Syngenta’s
public commitments to stewardship standards).
340
See supra text accompanying note 100 (noting the court’s ruling in Starlink
Corn that Aventis had a duty to not contaminate the human food supply with StarLink corn).
341
See supra text accompanying note 98 (describing the elements of negligence in
Starlink Corn).
342
See supra text accompanying notes 182–185 (describing the jury’s role in
determining negligence in LibertyLink Rice).
343
See supra text accompanying notes 222–Error! Bookmark not defined.
(describing Syngenta’s knowledge of the need to channel Agrisure Viptera corn away from
the Chinese market).
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from the seed bags and promising to send farmers future information after
the farmers had already bought the seeds.344 Not only did Syngenta take no
actions to mitigate damage to the corn market, but in 2014 it pushed forward
with its commercialization of Agrisure Duracade.345 However, Syngenta
could argue that negligence is not as clear here as in the Starlink Corn and
LibertyLink Rice cases because Syngenta’s corn was never in violation of
U.S. regulations.346
Moreover, in the context of a state claim for negligence, the fact
pattern suggests that Syngenta was less negligent than the defendants in
LibertyLink Rice and Starlink Corn.347 The negligence claims in Syngenta
are arguably even less persuasive because Syngenta did not violate any U.S.
regulations when it sold the corn.348 The crop was approved in the United
States; the primary issue was that the corn was sold overseas and mixed with
other corn sold overseas, where it was rejected by China.349 Arguably, this
long causal chain makes Syngenta less culpable than the Aventis and Bayer
corporations, which violated U.S. regulations.350
The final elements of negligence, proximate cause and damages, are
also issues for a jury to decide.351 The damages alleged by the Syngenta Corn
plaintiffs are market loss damages, essentially the difference between the
price they expected to receive for their corn and the price that they actually
received.352 The task of putting a dollar amount on those damages will go to
a jury and no doubt require the testimony of expert witnesses.353 Proximate
cause will also be a jury question, but the results for Syngenta Corn are
relatively predictable from the facts as now known.354 To show proximate
cause, plaintiffs will have to tie Syngenta’s actions to the drop in price for

344
See supra text accompanying notes 224–226 (describing Syngenta’s vague and
insufficient warnings to farmers that Agrisure Viptera corn was not accepted by China).
345
See supra text accompanying note 218 (describing Syngenta’s
commercialization of Agrisure Duracade).
346
See supra text accompanying note 213 (explaining that the EPA approved
Agrisure Viptera corn for all uses).
347
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the facts of Starlink Corn); supra Part II.C.1
(discussing facts of LibertyLink Rice); supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the facts of Syngenta
Corn).
348
See supra text accompanying note 211 (noting that Agrisure Duracade corn
was approved for all uses in the United States).
349
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the facts of Syngenta Corn).
350
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the facts of Starlink Corn); supra Part II.C.1
(discussing the facts of LibertyLink Rice); supra Part II.D.1 (discussing facts of Syngenta
Corn).
351
See supra text accompanying notes 182–185 (describing the jury’s role in
determining negligence in LibertyLink Rice).
352
See supra text accompanying notes 231–234 (describing the formation of Five
Star Farms and Wilson Farm’s class of plaintiffs in order to seek market loss damages).
353
See, e.g., supra text and accompanying footnotes for notes 224–225 (including
estimates from trade industry groups on the damage caused by Agrisure Viptera corn).
354
See supra Part II.D.1 (describing the facts of Syngenta Corn).
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U.S. corn.355 This requirement seems attainable because the decline in the
price of corn correlates with the timeframe of China’s rejection of Agrisure
Viptera corn.356 Of course, correlation is not causation, but plaintiffs should
be able to make the correlation look convincing with enough expert
witnesses and economic data.
In sum, it seems likely that the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs have a
strong case for negligence.357 For future plaintiffs, it is vital to show
causation and strong economic markers for market loss to successfully
recover sufficient damages to cover the plaintiffs’ losses.
3. Private Nuisance is an Effective Claim because Defendants Control and
Perpetuate the Nuisance in these Cases
The success of the private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn and
LibertyLink Rice shows that it is an effective claim for plaintiffs suing seed
companies.358 The elements of private nuisance may vary from state to state,
but the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ standard provides sufficient guidance
for plaintiffs.359 Nuisance claims are effective claims for plaintiffs because
they generally do not require a showing of intent.360
The key to liability for a nuisance is proving that the seed company
had control over the nuisance.361 The seed company’s reticence to stop or
mitigate the nuisance when it has the power to do so indicates responsibility
and culpability.362

355

See supra text accompanying notes 154–158 (discussing how the escape of
LibertyLink rice negatively affected the prices for rice, directly causing damage to rice
farmers).
356
See supra text accompanying notes 223–Error! Bookmark not defined.
(describing the negative effect on corn prices).
357
See supra Part II.D.1 (describing the facts of Syngenta Corn); see also Part
II.D.2 (describing the allegations in Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm complaints); Part
II.D.3.A (describing the allegations of negligence in Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm
complaints).
358
See supra Part II.B.2.D (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing private and public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice).
359
See supra note 107 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
360
See supra Part II.B.2.D (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing private and public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice); supra
Part II.D.3.B (discussing private nuisance in Five Star Farms). To prevail in a private nuisance
claim, a plaintiff must prove an invasion or interference with their use and enjoyment of their
property or land. See supra, note 107 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
361
See supra text accompanying notes 108–109 (noting that the court in Starlink
Corn found that Aventis was no longer in control of the corn after Aventis sold the corn, but
that Aventis was responsible for the nuisance the corn created under a theory of substantial
participation).
362
See supra Part II.B.2.D, D.3.B (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink
Corn and Five Star Farms); supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing private and public nuisance
claims in LibertyLink Rice).
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Plaintiffs should be prepared to counter the arguments made by the
defendants. For example, Aventis, the seed company in Starlink Corn,
disputed the element of control, arguing that it lost control of the corn after it
sold the corn.363 The court held that control could still be found by Aventis’s
substantially participation in carrying on the nuisance by selling the corn.364
Substantial participation is a good argument for plaintiffs seeking to hold
seed companies responsible for a nuisance.365 The argument is especially
effective for Syngenta Corn plaintiffs because Syngenta perpetuated the
nuisance, not only by continuing to sell Agrisure Viptera after China began
rejecting it, but also by beginning to sell Agrisure Duracade corn.366
Plaintiffs can show interference in the use and enjoyment of land or
property by pointing to the fact that their crop, previously accepted in all
markets, is now only viable for sale in a few.367 The narrowed options for
sale certainly interfere with the plaintiffs’ use of the crop.368
4. Public Nuisance is an Effective Claim in Instances Where the General
Public Experienced Harm
For plaintiffs to win on a public nuisance theory, they must establish
both the existence of a nuisance to the general public and that the harm to
plaintiffs was different than the harm suffered by the general public.369 The
court held in Starlink Corn that there was a public nuisance, and that the
public experienced the harm of an adulterated food supply, whereas the
plaintiffs experienced the loss in value of a crop that was their livelihood.370
In contrast, the LibertyLink Rice plaintiffs were unable to establish that the
rice was a nuisance.371 The difference was that StarLink corn was known by

363

See supra text accompanying notes 108–110 (noting Aventis’ losing argument
in Starlink Corn that it lost control over the corn after it was sold).
364
See supra text accompanying note 109 (discussing the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ decision that Aventis was responsible for the corn it
sold under the theory of substantial participation).
365
See supra Part II.B.2.D (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn).
366
See supra Part II.B.2.D (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra text accompanying note 218 (describing Syngenta’s commercialization of Agrisure
Duracade).
367
See supra Part II.B.2.D (discussing private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing private and public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice); supra
Part II.D.3.B (discussing private nuisance in Five Star Farms).
368
Id.
369
See supra Part II.B.2.E (discussing public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice).
370
See supra Part II.B.2.E (discussing public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn).
371
See supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing public nuisance claims in LibertyLink
Rice).
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the EPA to cause allergenic reactions in some people, whereas no health
effects were alleged by the consumption of LibertyLink Rice.372
Agrisure Viptera and Duracade corn were approved for all uses in
the United States and there were no allegations of allergenic reactions or
other health side effects.373 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Syngenta Corn will
probably not succeed on a claim for public nuisance.374 As for harm to the
public, there is simply no evidence that the general public was harmed by the
corn or by China’s rejection of the corn.375
However, in future cases where plaintiffs are suing seed companies,
if the crop in question was not approved for human consumption but ended
up in the food supply, it should be easy to show a public nuisance existed.376
The plaintiffs can cite to Starlink Corn to argue that the public is
experiencing harm from the nuisance in the form of an adulterated food
supply.377 The rest of the analysis will then depend on whether the plaintiffs
can show that they suffered a unique harm.378
5. Conversion is an Ineffective Claim Because the Chattels Are Not
Intentionally Converted
Conversion is an ineffectual claim in cases where seed companies
misrepresentations harmed plaintiffs ecause plaintiffs will be hard-pressed to
show that a seed company had intentional control over the crop in
question.379 In Starlink Corn, the plaintiffs failed to plead intent so the claim
was dismissed.380 The plaintiffs in LibertyLink Rice, Wilson Farm, and Five
Star Farms did not assert a claim of conversation against the defendants.381
Syngenta Corn is a testament to plaintiffs’ uphill battle to prove the
elements of conversion.382 The chattel in question is the corn. However, there
372

See supra note 71 (noting a class action settlement with consumers who alleged
they suffered allergenic effects after consuming StarLink corn); supra text accompanying note
156 (noting that LibertyLink rice was retroactively approved for all uses).
373
See supra text accompanying note 213 (explaining that the EPA had approved
Agrisure Viptera corn for all uses).
374
See supra Part II.B.2.E (discussing public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice).
375
See supra text accompanying note 213 (explaining that the EPA had approved
Agrisure Viptera corn for all uses).
376
See supra Part II.B.2.E (discussing the public nuisance claims in Starlink
Corn).
377
See supra Part II.B.2.E (discussing public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2.D (discussing public nuisance claims in LibertyLink Rice).
378
Id.
379
See supra Part II.B.2.F (discussing the required intent element for conversion
in Starlink Corn).
380
See supra Part II.B.2.F (describing Starlink Corn plaintiffs’ failure to plead the
element of intent in their claim for conversion).
381
See supra Part II.C.2 (declining to claim conversion in LibertyLink Rice); supra
Part II.D.3 (declining to claim conversion in Wilson Farm or Five Star Farms).
382
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing facts of Syngenta Corn).
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is no evidence that Syngenta controlled the corn of the plaintiffs, much less
intended to control it, particularly in light of the fact that the Syngenta Corn
plaintiffs never bought Agrisure Viptera or Agrisure Duracade corn.383 The
plaintiffs could show serious interference with their right to sell their corn for
the uses they expected to sell it for, but as in Starlink Corn, the court will
probably find that a decline in market price, regardless of whether or not it
was connected to Syngenta’s actions, is not interference with control of the
corn itself, but merely interference with the price of the market.384 Without
those essential elements, justice would not require Syngenta to give
compensation to the plaintiffs.385
The Wilson Farm and Five Star Farms plaintiffs must have taken
note of the judge’s memo in Starlink Corn, noting that the seed company’s
actions could posit a claim for trespass to chattels, because they brought
claims for trespass to chattels.386
6. Trespass to Chattels is Untested in Courts and Plaintiffs May Struggle
to Prove the Element of Intent
Similar to conversion, trespass to chattels is not an effective claim
for plaintiffs because it requires plaintiffs to prove intent to dispossess or
interfere with the plaintiffs’ chattels.387 Admittedly, the strength of the claim
of trespass to chattels is hard to ascertain because the claim was not pled in
Starlink Corn or LibertyLink Rice.388 The elements of what constitutes
trespass to chattels may vary from state to state, but the Restatement
definition includes an element of intent.389 Plaintiffs will probably struggle to
show that a seed company intended to dispossess or interfere with their
chattels.390 Generally, a seed company simply intends to sell seed. For
example, if the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs argue that Syngenta intentionally
dispossessed them of the corn or intentionally used or interfered with the
corn, Syngenta will probably respond that it took no further actions after

383

See supra text accompanying note 305 (noting that the Syngenta Corn plaintiffs
are farmers or farm entities that did not purchase Syngenta’s corn).
384
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing facts of Syngenta Corn); supra text
accompanying notes 114–16 (discussing elements of conversion in Starlink Corn).
385
See supra text accompanying note 122 (explaining when the element of justice
is at play).
386
See supra Part II.D.3.C (discussing claim for trespass to chattels in Five Star
Farms and Wilson Farm).
387
See supra text accompanying note Error! Bookmark not defined. (reciting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT’S definition of trespass to chattels).
388
See supra Part II.B.2 (declining to claim trespass to chattels in Starlink Corn);
supra Part II.C.2 (declining to claim trespass to chattels in LibertyLink Rice).
389
See supra text accompanying note Error! Bookmark not defined. (citing the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
390
See supra text accompanying notes 261–264 (describing the series of
inferences that established the requisite intent in LibertyLink Rice).
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selling the corn to the plaintiffs.391 Demonstrating dispossession is unlikely
because seed companies do not physically usurp the seeds; rather, they
indirectly do so by limiting the markets the seeds can be sold in.392
Furthermore, Syngenta lost possession of the corn after sale, and as far as
plaintiffs who never bought the Agrisure Viptera and Duracade seed,
Syngenta never had possession of their corn seed at all.393 Should the
plaintiffs try to show that Syngenta intentionally used or interfered with their
corn,Syngenta will probably argue that while it may have intentionally
refrained from informing consumers that the corn was not accepted in China,
its intent was to continue to sell corn, thus divesting itself of the corn and not
retaining use over it.394
Syngenta could also argue that Syngenta’s actions may have had a
negative effect on the market prices, but that the decline in market price does
not equate to Syngenta using the plaintiffs’ corn. The plaintiffs can argue that
Syngenta’s interference with the price, unlike a claim for conversion, does
not have to be so serious as to change the product’s essential character; it just
has to interfere with its normal use.395 The Restatement states that liability
may be ascribed if the chattel is “impaired as to its condition, quality, or
value.”396 Syngenta could argue that the corn itself is not impaired; it is just
as sound and nutritious as it was before. To counter, the plaintiffs should
argue that the value of the corn changed substantially.397 The corn went from
a corn that could be sold in any market, to a corn that could only be sold in
select markets.398 Furthermore, those markets that remained were now
buying the corn at lower prices.399
To revisit Starlink Corn, the plaintiffs could have argued that
Aventis’s knowledge of the risks of commercializing the corn equated to
intent.400 The plaintiffs should have argued that when Aventis sold farmers
the StarLink corn without properly explaining that the corn was not approved
391

See, e.g., text accompanying notes 108–114 (noting Aventis’ argument in
Starlink Corn that it no longer had control over the seed after it sold the seed).
392
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the facts of Syngenta Corn).
393
See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the facts of Syngenta Corn).
394
See supra text accompanying note 268 (discussing plaintiffs’ reliance on the
argument that Syngenta’s premature commercialization constituted intent to interfere with
plaintiffs chattels).
395
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (stating that the change in price
may constitute interference).
396
See supra text accompanying note 260 (reciting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORT’S definition of trespass to chattels).
397
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (stating that the change in price
may constitute interference).
398
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (stating that the change in price
may constitute interference); supra Part II.D.1 (discussing facts of Syngenta Corn).
399
See supra text accompanying notes 211–220 (discussing the drop in market
price of corn and limited market after China rejected Agrisure Viptera corn).
400
See supra text accompanying note 127 (noting that the Starlink Corn court
ruled that Aventis’ negligent behavior was not sufficient to prove intent).
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for human consumption, Aventis knew of the risk that the corn could
contaminate the rest of the corn supply and end up in the food supply.401
When Aventis sold the corn anyway, it arguably intentionally subjected
farmers to a situation where their corn would lose value and would be unfit
for its intended use.402
Ultimately, the value of plaintiffs’ claim is unknown until there is
case law that specifically speaks to the issue. However, it is probable that
courts are unlikely to accept plaintiffs’ contention that defendant’s
knowledge or risk equals intent to cause harm to plaintiffs.403 Overall,
plaintiffs in these cases will be more likely to develop strong cases for
negligence or nuisance, so the possibility of success on a trespass to chattels
claim would be a possible additional claim, but not determinative in whether
or not the plaintiffs could recover.404
7. Plaintiffs Must Show Standing to Plead Claims Under the Lanham Act
and State Consumer Protection Acts
The torts claims presented above are not the entire universe of
options available for plaintiffs suing seed companies. Plaintiff can also look
to the federal Lanham Act and to state consumer protection statutes.405
However, in the cases involving nationwide classes, plaintiff diversity makes
it difficult for them to show standing under specific state statutes.406 The
federal Lanham Act avoids that issue.407
i. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act will come into play whenever the plaintiffs’ theory
of recovery depends on theories of misrepresentation or false advertising by
401

See supra text accompanying notes 52–58 (describing the EPA restrictions on
StarLink corn that Aventis ignored).
402
See supra text accompanying note 61 (describing how Aventis allegedly told
farmers not to follow restrictions).
403
See supra, text accompanying note 127 (describing the Starlink Corn court’s
rejection of plaintiffs’ argument that the negligent business practices of Aventis could be
construed as intent).
404
See supra Part III.B.2–4 (arguing that negligence and private and public
nuisance are the most effective claims for plaintiffs).
405
See supra Part II.B.2.G (discussing Starlink Corn claims under the NCUTPA
and the TCPA); supra Part II.C.2.E (discussing LibertyLink Rice claims under the NCUTPA);
supra Part II.D.3.D (discussing Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm claims under the Lanham
Act and various state consumer protection acts).
406
See supra text accompanying notes 130–132 (ruling that the Starlink Corn
plaintiffs did not have standing under the NCUTPA, but did have it under the TCPA); supra
text accompanying note 130 (ruling that the LibertyLink Rice plaintiffs did not have standing
under the NCUTPA because it was meant to protect North Carolinians).
407
See supra note 266 and accompanying text (explaining that the Lanham Act
provides a civil remedy for false advertising).
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the defendants.408 This is the key issue in Syngenta Corn.409 Although there
were suggestions of misleading advertising in Starlink Corn, a claim under
the Lanham Act is notably absent. 410 The plaintiffs may not have pursued a
claim under the Lanham Act because at the time of the Starlink Corn
litigation, 2002-2003, there was a split in the circuits over how to determine
if a plaintiff had standing to plead a claim under the Lanham Act.411 The
violation of the Lanham Act was also not an issue in LibertyLink Rice
because there were no allegations that Bayer had committed false or
misleading advertising.412
The Lanham Act will probably be of particular importance in
Syngenta Corn because the plaintiffs cannot claim that Syngenta violated any
U.S. regulations.413 The Syngenta Corn plaintiffs’ argument is that plaintiffs
did not know the corn was not approved by import by China until it was too
late.414 The key to the plaintiffs’ recovery is to prove that Syngenta was
fraudulent or misleading in their representations about the corn and where it
could be sold and what it could be used for.415
The Lanham Act should be a strong remedy for future plaintiffs in a
similar position. In light of the unsuccessful attempts to recover damages
under state consumer protection statutes prohibiting false or misleading
advertising, the Lanham Act is a welcome alternative for future plaintiffs.416
Especially in a class action, suing under a federal statute for false advertising
should be easier for plaintiffs than suing under individual state consumer
protection statutes.417
ii. State Consumer Protection Acts
Apart from the Lanham Act, the plaintiffs’ option to address
misrepresentation or false advertising is to sue under various state consumer
408
409
410
411

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 229 (alleging misrepresentation).
See supra Part II.B.2 (listing Starlink Corn’s legal claims).
See supra note 231 (describing the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit

split).

412
See supra text accompanying note 149 (explaining that LibertyLink rice was
never sold, rather, the rice escaped the experimental test plots it had been planted in).
413
See supra text accompanying note 213 (explaining that the EPA had approved
Agrisure Viptera corn for all uses).
414
See supra text accompanying note 241 (describing Syngenta’s
misrepresentation about the status of StarLink corn’s approval in major export markets).
415
See supra note 266 and accompanying text (explaining that the Lanham Act
provides a civil remedy for false advertising).
416
See supra text accompanying notes 266–71 (discussing the Lanham Act).
417
See supra text accompanying notes 130–137 (noting the United States District
Court of the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling that the Starlink Corn plaintiffs did not have
standing under the NCUTPA, but did have it under the TCPA); see supra text accompanying
notes 200–07 (noting the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Missouri’s
ruling that the LibertyLink Rice plaintiffs did not have standing under the NCUTPA because it
was meant to protect North Carolinians).
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protection acts.418 At this point, plaintiffs have found it hard to prove they
have sufficient standing under state laws because these suits are class actions
that include plaintiffs from many different states.419 Plaintiffs have sued as
state specific groups under state laws, or attempted to sue as nationwide
classes under laws with nationwide reach, such as the NCUTPA and the
TCPA.420 However, plaintiffs found that they could not show sufficient
standing under NCUTPA because they lacked sufficient contacts with North
Carolina.421 The TCPA was written more broadly, so it survived the motion
to dismiss in Starlink Corn.422 Whether plaintiffs will have standing under
these state consumer protections acts will be a matter of statutory
interpretation.423 Plaintiffs should analyze case law interpreting standing
under specific state consumer protection statutes.424
IV. CONCLUSION
In cases where plaintiffs are harmed by seed companies’
misrepresentations, the very nature of the global agricultural industry makes
it difficult to prove tort claims that require intent.425 The global commodity
crop markets, the ability for genetically engineered genes to escape even
strict confines, and the passage of time in a crop season, combine to place
both spatial and temporal distance between the actions of the seed companies
and the harm experienced by the farmers.426

418

See supra Part II.B.2.G (discussing Starlink Corn claims under the NCUTPA
and the TCPA); supra Part II.C.2.E (discussing LibertyLink Rice claims under the NCUTPA),
supra Part II.D.3.D (discussing Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm claims under the Lanham
Act and various state consumer protection acts).
419
See supra text accompanying note 129 (noting the state classes in Starlink
Corn); supra text accompanying notes 163–167 (noting the state classes in LibertyLink Rice).
420
See supra Part II.B.2.G (discussing Starlink Corn claims under the NCUTPA
and the TCPA); supra Part II.C.2.E (discussing LibertyLink Rice claims under the NCUTPA);
supra Part II.D.3.D (discussing Five Star Farms and Wilson Farm claims under various state
consumer protection acts).
421
See supra text accompanying note 129 (noting the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling that the Starlink Corn plaintiffs did not have
standing under the NCUTPA).
422
See supra text accompanying note 130 (noting the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling that Starlink Corn plaintiffs had standing under the
TCPA).
423
See supra text accompanying notes 129–131 (noting the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ on the standing requirements of the NCUTPA and
the TCPA); supra text accompanying notes 200–205 (noting the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling on the standing requirements of the NCUTPA).
424
Id.
425
See supra text accompanying notes 2–8 (describing genetic engineering’s
challenges against a backdrop of complex commodity system).
426
See supra text accompanying notes 2–8 (describing genetic engineering’s
challenges against a backdrop of complex commodity system); supra text accompanying note
124 (describing the escape from test plots of the unapproved LibertyLink rice).
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Plaintiffs should confidently proceed with these lawsuits because
similarly situated plaintiffs have successfully recovered damages.427 The
strongest tort claims for farmers and businesses injured by seed companies
are negligence, private nuisance, and public nuisance.428 Negligence is an
effective claim for plaintiffs because plaintiffs can more easily demonstrate
that seed companies caused harm negligently than intentionally.429 By the
nature of the concepts, negligence is always easier to prove than intent.430
Intent is particularly hard to find in these cases because of the attenuation
between the seed companies’ actions and the harm experienced by the
plaintiffs.431
Private nuisance and public nuisance are effective claims for
plaintiffs in specific factual scenarios. Claims of private and public nuisance
do not generally require intent on the part of the defendant.432 Private
nuisance is an effective claim because plaintiffs in these cases have factual
patterns that lend themselves to showing that there was interference with
their property that caused harm to the plaintiffs.433 Public nuisance will be an
effective claim if the genetically engineered crop in question is a nuisance to
the public and is considered harmful to human health.434
On the other hand, claims of negligence per se, trespass to chattels,
and conversion are weak claims that are unlikely to be effective remedies for
the injured businesses or farmers because they require intentional conduct, a
difficult burden to show in these cases.435 There are several difficulties in
showing the intent to cause harm. First, the long chain of causation between
the seed companies’ actions in selling the seed to farmers and the harm
experienced by farmers makes it difficult to trace how the seed company’s

427

See supra text accompanying note 73 (discussing settlement award in Starlink
Corn); supra text accompanying notes 165 (discussing settlement award in LibertyLink Rice).
428
See supra Part III.B.2–4 (analyzing the success of the negligence, private
nuisance, and public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice).
429
See supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the success of the negligence claims in
Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice)
430
See supra text accompanying notes 126–127 (noting that the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois declined to find that Aventis acted
intentionally but did find Aventis’ actions sufficient to find that Aventis acted negligently).
431
See supra text accompanying notes 214–220 (discussing the circumstances of
how China’s rejection of Agrisure Viptera corn caused a price in the drop of corn and
resulting economic damage).
432
See supra text accompanying note 107 (noting the elements of a private
nuisance claim in Starlink Corn); supra text accompanying note 116 (noting the elements of a
public nuisance claim in Starlink Corn).
433
See supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the private nuisance claims in Starlink Corn
and LibertyLink Rice).
434
See supra Part III.B.4 (analyzing the public nuisance claims in Starlink Corn
and LibertyLink Rice).
435
See supra Part III.B.1,5, 6 (analyzing the negligence per se, trespass to chattels,
and conversion claims in Starlink Corn and LibertyLink Rice).
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actions caused the harm to the farmers.436 Secondly, although motive is not
technically a part of intent, it is difficult to provide a compelling reason for
seed companies to intentionally harm farmers.437 Of course, the intention of
the seed companies could arguably be construed as a shortsighted intent to
maximize profits at the expense of the farmers.438 Intent is certainly an
arguable element, and plaintiffs should not entirely throw aside the claims
based on proving intent, but the fact remains that the intent is difficult to
prove.
The discouraging lesson from Starlink Corn, LibertyLink Rice, and
Syngenta Corn is that certain seed companies put profits before caution when
it comes to introducing new varieties of genetically engineered crops.439
Even more disappointing and disheartening to the U.S. farmer or exporter is
that the seed companies show no signs of changing their behavior. The poster
child is Bayer CropScience, the company that negligently allowed the
LibertyLink rice to escape test plots and contaminate the U.S. rice supply
while wrapping up litigation over the farmers it had harmed with StarLink
corn.440 The lawsuits filed against these seed companies do not seem to deter
seed companies’ wild race to market their products.441
Moreover, the United States’ patchwork regulatory system rewards
the seed companies’ “beg forgiveness later” approach by retroactively
approving genetically engineered crops.442 This approach may make life
easier for the regulatory bodies but it does not instill confidence in farmers
and exporters. Unfortunately for the U.S. agricultural industry, there are no
signs that the patchwork system that regulates genetic engineering will be
reformed.443 Therefore, the likely occurrence of future cases like Starlink

436
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 68–70 (describing effect on the
market price of corn and other measures of damage to plaintiffs after Starlink corn was
discovered in the human food supply).
437
See, e.g., note 210 and accompanying text (explaining Syngenta’s product line
and customer base; Syngenta makes billions selling seeds and chemicals to farmers).
438
See supra text accompanying note 218 (discussing Syngenta’s choice to sell
Agrisure Viptera with the knowledge that it was not accepted in China).
439
See supra Part II.B.1, C.1, D.1 (presenting the facts in Starlink Corn,
LibertyLink Rice and Syngenta Corn).
440
See supra note 148 and accompanying text (noting that Aventis was acquired
by Bayer while Aventis was embroiled in the Starlink Corn litigation).
441
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76–77 (describing lawsuits filed
against Aventis because of StarLink Corn); supra text accompanying notes 166–168
(describing lawsuits filed against Bayer (formerly Aventis) because of LibertyLink rice);
supra text accompanying notes 214–220 (describing Syngenta’s commercialization of
Agrisure Duracade despite China’s rejection of Agrisure Viptera).
442
See supra note 52–53 and accompanying text (noting Aventis’ efforts to obtain
retroactive approval of StarLink Corn); supra text accompanying note 153 (noting how
LibertyLink rice was retroactively approved). (158.
443
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting the continued use of a
patchwork regulatory system by the United States for genetically engineered crops despite
recommendations from scholars)
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Corn, LibertyLink Rice, and Syngenta Corn is not a question of if, but one of
when.
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